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A Rational Theory of Mitigation and
Aggravation in Sentencing: Why Less is More
When it Comes to Punishing Criminals
MIRKO BAGARIC†
INTRODUCTION
Sentencing involves the intentional infliction of pain.1 It
is the legal domain where the state acts in its most forceful
manner against individuals. It is important that the
sentencing system is fair and effective. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. In the sentencing arena there is a gulf between
knowledge and practice. Sentencing is a politicized domain,
and hence, law and practice are often detached from
knowledge. This is evident in four key areas of sentencing
policy and practice.
Most broadly, it relates to the ongoing uncertainty
regarding which theory of punishment should underpin the
system. Retributivism has replaced utilitarianism as the
most popular contemporary theory of punishment;2 however,
the change has not heavily impacted legislative and judicial
developments and certainly traditional utilitarian aims
continue to heavily influence sentencing practice and policy.
Secondly, a lack of empirical and scientific certainty remains
regarding the efficacy of state-imposed punishment to
achieve key (utilitarian) goals of sentencing in the form of
incapacitation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and
rehabilitation.3 Moreover, to the extent that convergence
exists regarding the efficacy of sentencing to attain these
† Professor and Dean of Law, Deakin University, Melbourne.
1. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158-59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); C.L. TEN, CRIME
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 2 (1987).
2. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 131-33 (2000) [hereinafter Bagaric & Amarasekara, The
Errors of Retributivism].
3. See infra Part VI.
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objectives, this knowledge generally has not been applied in
a manner that shapes sentencing law and practice.
Thirdly, while there is a wide-ranging consensus that the
principle of proportionality4 should be the dominant criterion
determining penalty nature and length, the content of the
principle remains unstable and nebulous. In its most basic
and influential form, proportionalism is the theory that the
punishment should fit the crime.5 However, the vagaries
associated with the content of the principle are so pronounced
that it is verging on doctrinal and intellectual fiction to
suggest that an objective answer can be given to common
sentencing dilemmas, such as how many years’
imprisonment is equivalent to the pain felt by an assault or
rape victim, or whether a burglar should be dealt with by way
of imprisonment or fine, or the appropriate sanction for a
drug trafficker. There is no demonstrable violation of
proportionalism if a mugger, robber, or drug trafficker is
sentenced to either ten months or ten years imprisonment.
Finally, the least developed and settled area of
sentencing law relates to the considerations that operate to
increase or decrease a penalty beyond the standard penalty
for the relevant offense type. These factors are known as
aggravating and mitigating considerations.
There are no standard definitions of what constitute
aggravating or mitigating factors. However, as a matter of
principle, an aggravating factor is a consideration that is not
contained within the elements of the offense, which makes
the offense worse or otherwise justifies a heavier penalty. A
mitigating factor is a consideration that justifies a more
lenient penalty.6
Common aggravating factors include prior criminal
history and breach of trust. Widely accepted mitigating
factors include cooperating with authorities and having a
4. See infra Part VII (discussing that proportionality, in essence, is the view
that the harshness of the punishment should match the severity of the
seriousness of the crime).
5. See infra Part VII.
6. Marker v The Queen [2002] WASCA 282, ¶ 22 (Court of Criminal Appeal)
(Austl.).
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minor role in the crime. However, there is not even a loose
consensus regarding the operation of most mitigating and
aggravating considerations, despite the fact that the
presence of an aggravating or mitigating consideration can
have a profound impact on a penalty. For example, prior
criminality can add ten years or more to the length of a prison
term for some offenses in the United States.7
Most factors that serve to increase or decrease penalties
have emerged in an ad hoc manner, not underpinned by a
clear objective, and, normally, the weight and emphasis
placed on them in determining penalty is unclear. This area
of law is “under-researched”8 and in need of extensive
analysis. Current jurisprudence is so shallow and unsettled
that some factors can be either mitigatory or aggravating.9
Factors that tend to increase or decrease penalty have
evolved impressionistically; so much so that Andrew
Ashworth has commented that “this is a sphere in which
discretion has led largely to anarchy.”10 He adds that “[t]he
role of aggravating and mitigating factors is . . . left
largely . . . unbridled and untamed, a tendency that
undermines the rationale of sentencing guidelines in
providing common starting points and shared standards.”11
This Article attempts to address this gap in the literature
and law and develops a coherent doctrinal rationale for
aggravating and mitigating sentencing considerations12 in
7. See infra Part II.
8. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and
Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 1
(Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
9. Id. at 3.
10. Andrew Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and
Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 17
(Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
11. Id. at 17 (citing Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Justice, Rights and
Sentencing: A Review of Sentencing Policy and Problems, 30-31 (1987)
(unpublished manuscript) (Worcester College, Oxford), and Claire Corbett,
Magistrates’ and Court Clerks’ Sentencing Behaviour: An Experimental Study, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENTENCING: APPROACHES TO CONSISTENCY AND DISPARITY
(Donald C. Pennington & Sally Llyod-Bostock eds., 1987)).
12. Allan Mason, The Search for Principles of Mitigation: Integrating Cultural
Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 40-41 (Julian V.
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order to harmonize and justify this area of the body of law. It
is a particularly important issue to resolve at this juncture.
Recently the Federal Sentencing Commission in the United
States has recognized the open-ended nature of aggravating
and mitigating considerations13 and hence there is now
greater scope to influence the development of this area of the
law.
By way of background and context, this Article focuses
on existing sentencing law in the United States and
Australia. Those jurisdictions are considered because they
have contrasting approaches to mitigating and aggravating
factors. With only a hint of exaggeration, in Australia nearly
every consideration potentially aggravates or mitigates
(there are several hundred such considerations);14 while, in
the United States, very few factors aggravate or mitigate (in
most jurisdictions there are only two to three dozen factors
approximately that increase or decrease a penalty).15 The
contrast between the richness and the dearth of aggravating
and mitigating considerations in Australia and the United
States provides a fertile and illuminating context to this
continually evolving but jurisprudentially vacuous area of
law. The conclusions reached in this Article are transferrable
to all sentencing systems.
In the next Part of the Article, I provide an overview of
the existing sentencing regimes in the United States and
Australia with a focus on aggravating and mitigating
considerations. In Part III, I argue that the approaches in
both systems are logically, empirically, and jurisprudentially
Roberts ed., 2011) (arguing that it is not tenable to find principles that define
mitigating factors adequately because of the complex range of factors that impact
on sentencing—which go beyond normative principles and include cultural
factors).
13. See Amy Baron-Evans & Jennifer Niles Coffin, No More Math Without
Subtraction: Deconstructing the Guidelines’ Prohibitions and Restrictions on
Mitigating Factors, LITIGATING MITIGATING FACTORS: DEPARTURES, VARIANCES,
AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (Defender Servs. Office Training Div.,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 15, 2011, at i-iii.
14. Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing
the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars,
19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 371 n.113 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, From
Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing].
15. See infra Part II.A.
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flawed. The rest of the Article develops a unifying theory to
cohere this area of law.
I conclude that considerations should only aggravate or
mitigate a sentence if they: (i) advance an objective of
sentencing (which itself is justifiable); (ii) are necessary to
give effect to the proportionality principle; (iii) are justified
by reference to broader objectives of the criminal justice
system; or (iv) are supported by reference to the
requirements of broader (concrete) principles of justice.
The application of this framework results in a clear
demarcation of a small number of aggravating and
mitigating considerations. It is recommended that legislative
changes should be made to incorporate these considerations
into the sentencing system, while, at the same time,
abolishing all other aggravating and mitigating factors.
Further research may increase or reduce the number of
aggravating or mitigating factors. Accordingly, the list set
out in this Article is neither set in stone nor conclusive.
However, the rationale and methodology advanced in this
Article set out a coherent procedure for assessing the validity
of putative sentencing considerations.
Before dealing with the core issue in this Article, I
elaborate on the importance and limits of the current
discussion to the sentencing landscape as a whole.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AGGRAVATION AND
MITIGATION “RIGHT”
Sentencing is a purposeful endeavor, and to operate
fairly and efficiently it must be grounded in coherent and
sound normative theory and have clear and attainable
objectives, which are empirically validated. As noted above,
broadly, there are four different levels of inquiry that exist in
the sentencing realm. A model sentencing system can only be
maintained if there is strategic clarity and alignment in all
four areas. The broadest level of inquiry concerns the
justification for state-imposed punishment.
There are two main theories of punishment.
Utilitarianism is the view that punishment is inherently bad
due to the pain it causes the wrongdoer but is ultimately
justified because the pain is outweighed by the good
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consequences stemming from it.16 The main competing
theory, and the one which enjoys the most contemporary
support, is retributivism.17 Potentially, the choice of the
theory of punishment that underpins sentencing is important
because it logically guides the sentencing objectives that
should be pursued. Utilitarianism promotes the pursuit of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, while
retributivism is synonymous with “just deserts” and gives
priority to proportionalism as the key sentencing objective.18
The next main level of inquiry relates to the concrete
objectives that should be pursued by the sentencing system.
Typically, the main objectives pursued are general
deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. The soundness of pursuing those goals,
however, is logically contingent on the efficacy of criminal
sanctions to achieve them. That is an empirical question.
The third level of inquiry attempts to match the
seriousness of the crime with the harshness of the
punishment. That is the proportionality requirement. The
importance of proportionalism is impacted potentially by the
theory of punishment chosen. Further, it can also be
impacted by the pursuit of sentencing objectives. For
example, attempts to achieve the goals of general deterrence
or incapacitation could result in harsher penalties being
imposed than are commensurate with the seriousness of the
offenses.
In addition, and this is the fourth level of inquiry, it is
necessary to differentiate when penalties should be adjusted
from those that are deemed to be proportionate to the gravity
of the crime (and which incorporate adjustments for any
relevant sentencing objectives). It is at this point that
aggravating and mitigating factors come into play.
Aggravating factors operate to increase the severity of
16. See Bagaric & Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, supra note 2, at
130-31.
17. See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 211 (rev.
ed. 1984); David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic
Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997).
18. See Bagaric & Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, supra note 2, at
131 nn. 23-24.
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punishment, while the effect of mitigating factors is to reduce
the harshness of the appropriate sanction.19 Thus, logically,
aggravating and mitigating factors are the fourth and last
tier of inquiry into an appropriate sentence.
However, bottom tier in this case does not equate to the
least important. In fact, aggravating and mitigating factors
are often the most influential and important considerations
regarding the choice and length of penalty. The most
powerful factor influencing penalty severity in many
jurisdictions, apart from offense type, is the offender’s prior
criminal history.20 Further, the most significant mitigating
factor in some jurisdictions is cooperation with law
enforcement officials which can reduce penalty length by up
to fifty percent.21 Thus, the discussion in this Article is
relevant to all core aspects of sentencing law and practice,
and the conclusions reached apply irrespective of which overarching theory of punishment is applied.
The next Part of the Article discusses the existing law
relating to aggravating and mitigating considerations. I then
explain why the choice of the theory of the punishment which
justifies sentencing practice does not, in fact, influence the
validity of potential aggravating and mitigating factors, and
why all sentencing objectives except incapacitation should
not inform the identification of such considerations. I then
establish an over-arching theory of aggravation and
mitigation and set out the considerations that, on the basis
of current learning, should properly reduce or increase a
penalty.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part of the Article focuses on current aggravating
and mitigating considerations. I first consider the relevant
law in the United States followed by the law in Australia. The
analysis provides the context and backdrop to demonstrate
the need for fundamental reform in this area.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part IX.
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A. Aggravation and Mitigation in the United States
Each state of the United States has its own sentencing
system, and there is considerable divergence across the
respective regimes.22 The federal jurisdiction also has a
discrete sentencing system, which is important because of
the large number of offenders sentenced under that system
and the considerable doctrinal influence it has at the state
level.23 Despite the sentencing variations across the United
States, several key commonalities and themes exist.
The key distinguishing aspect of the United States
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most
other sentencing systems in the world) is the wide-ranging
use of fixed or presumptive minimum penalties that exist, in
some form, in all U.S. states.24 As noted by Berman and
Bibas, “[o]ver the last half-century, sentencing has lurched
from a lawless morass of hidden, unreviewable discretion to
a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules.”25
None of these policies and practices emanates from a
clear theoretical foundation, but rather stem from “back-ofan-envelope
calculations
and
collective
intuitive
judgments.”26 Despite this, there is a convergence of
22. Sentencing (and, more generally, the criminal law) in the United States is
mainly the province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 61011 (2000). For more extensive analysis of the operation of sentencing in the United
States and Australia, see Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing,
supra note 14.
23. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible,
4 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 37, 40-41 (2006).
24. See CTR. FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012)
(noting that 137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties
but none of the others was as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States).
AND

25. Berman & Bibas, supra note 23, at 40.
26. MICHAEL TONRY, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 93
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For criticism of the
guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2005); Judge James
S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (2010).
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approach: “Modern sentencing reforms have repudiated
rehabilitation as a dominant goal of sentencing. Many
structured sentencing laws, including many guideline
sentencing systems and severe mandatory minimum
sentences, are designed principally to deter, incapacitate,
and punish offenders.”27
Most prescribed penalties are set out in sentencing grids
that typically use criminal history score28 and offense
seriousness to calculate an appropriate penalty. The grids
have a heavy emphasis on incapacitation. Perhaps the
greatest indication of the harshness of U.S. sentencing is the
rapid increase in imprisonment numbers over the past
twenty years.29 The U.S. now imprisons more of its citizens
than any other country; thus, its rate of imprisonment is also
the highest on earth.30 Presently, more than 1.5 million
Americans are in state or federal prison facilities.31 There are
approximately 200,000 federal prisoners and 1.3 million
state prisoners.32 If one includes the 744,500 inmates in local
jails, the total incarceration number is 2,240,600, which
equates to over 700 people per 100,000 adult population.33
This number peaked in 2009, after increasing more than
400% in three decades.34 The prison population has dropped

27. Berman & Bibas, supra note 23, at 48.
28. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior
convictions.
29. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN
ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012, at 1 (2013), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf.
30. INT’L
CTR.
FOR
PRISON
STUDIES,
WORLD
PRISON
BRIEF,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
31. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29.
32. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2012, at 10 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf.
33. Id. at 3.
34. On December 31, 1978, the number of prisoners was 294,000 and on
December 31, 2009, it was 1,555,600. Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29, at 1.
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for the past three years, but the reduction in overall terms
has been small—42,600 inmates (i.e., less than 3%).35
Most developed countries have rates of imprisonment
around five times less than the United States.36 In terms of
prisoners per 100,000 adult population, the rate in Canada is
118, Australia 143, and the United Kingdom 149.37 The
United States’ imprisonment rate is approximately ten times
that of Scandinavian countries.38
However, at least formally, incapacitation does not
overwhelm the sentencing objectives in the United States. As
noted by Traum, even in the federal system in 2008 only
approximately 28% of offenders are convicted under a statute
imposing a mandatory minimum.39
The most extensively analyzed and influential fixed
penalty laws are those set out in the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the “Federal
Sentencing Guidelines”).40 The Guidelines provide a useful
context to the current range of considerations that can
increase a penalty in the United States. They are important
not only because they have had a considerable impact on
state sentencing law but also because they stipulate a greater
number of aggravating considerations than many state
sentencing regimes.41
35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29, at 1.
On December 31, 2012, there were, in fact, 1,574,000 prisoners.
36. See INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30.
37. Id.
38. Per 100,000 adult population, the rate of imprisonment in Norway is 72,
Finland 58, and Sweden 60. Id.
39. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423,
451 (2012).
40. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
GUIDELINES MANUAL 394 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-pdf/2013_Guidelines_Manual_Full.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N]; see also Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note
13, at iii, for analysis and criticism of the Guidelines.
41. For an overview of aggravating and mitigating factors in state legislative
schemes, see Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing
Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1128-29 (2008). She notes that, like the Federal
Scheme, state non-capital schemes generally have more aggravating than
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In the Federal Sentencing Guideline system the range for
an offense is determined by reference to two main
considerations. The first is the offense level, which entails an
assessment of the seriousness of the offense (this often
includes a number of variables and, depending on the offense,
can include the nature of any injury caused or monetary
amount involved).42 The second is the offender’s criminal
history score, which is based on the seriousness of the past
offenses and the time that has elapsed since the prior
offending.43 These two calculations then operate to prescribe
a sentencing range.44 Thus, for example, an offense at level
20, for an offender with a criminal history score of 4, 5, or 6,
has a range of forty-one to fifty-one months; an offense at
level 36, for an offender with a criminal history score of 4, 5,
or 6, has a range of 235 to 293 months.45
There are forty-three different levels, with the penalties
increasing as the levels increase.46 An increase of six levels
approximately doubles the sentence.47 Where the range
includes a term of imprisonment, it is relatively narrow in
that it cannot exceed the minimum penalty by more than the

mitigating considerations. Id. There are seventeen states that set out both
aggravating and mitigating factors and, of these, twelve have more aggravating
considerations; two states have an equal number; three have more mitigating
considerations; and six states only identify aggravating considerations. Id. The
states with the highest number of combined aggravating considerations are:
Alaska (51); Illinois (49); North Carolina (44); Tennessee (35); Washington (34);
California (32); Louisiana (31); and Florida (29). States with low numbers are:
Hawaii (16); Idaho (15); Kansas (13); and Ohio (12). Id. at 1128-32. The fact that
there are generally more aggravating than mitigating considerations is consistent
with public opinion, which suggests that aggravating factors bear more heavily
on crime severity than mitigating considerations. See Julian V. Roberts & Mike
Hough, Exploring Public Attitudes to Sentencing Factors in England and Wales,
in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 168, 183 (Julian V. Roberts ed.,
2011).
42. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 394-96.
43. Id. at 396.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 395-96.
46. Id. at 395.
47. Id. at 11.
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greater of six months or twenty-five percent.48
Proportionality is pursued “through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity.”49 The sentencing ranges were not
developed in abstract or against a purely theoretical model.
They were influenced by an analysis of over 40,000 sentences
that had been imposed.50
These Guidelines are no longer mandatory, following the
United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Booker.51 The Guidelines are now advisory.52 However,
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 3.
50. See id. at 11 (“The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial
guidelines with considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal
statutes in the United States Code. It began with those that were the basis for a
significant number of prosecutions and sought to place them in a rational order.
It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of these provisions
and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied
on pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses
based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000
augmented pre-sentence reports, the parole guidelines, and policy judgments.”).
51. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that aspects
of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011);
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 265 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
52. Consequently, District Courts are required to properly calculate and
consider the guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(a)(5) (2012); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district
courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account
when sentencing.”); Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (“As a matter of administration and to
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and
the initial benchmark.”); Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (stating that a district court should
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable
Guidelines range). The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence in
a particular case, therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline
range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy statements, and then the
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita, 551 U.S. at 338. The appellate court
engages in a two-step process upon review:
[The appellate court] first ensure[s] that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range . . . [and] then consider[s] the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
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sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in
approximately sixty percent of cases.53 Set penalties apply to
most types of offenses, including drug, fraud, and
immigration crime.
While criminal history score and offense severity are
cardinal sentencing considerations, they do not exhaust all of
the matters that influence the penalty. The considerations
that impact a sentence are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which
states:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of
this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence
to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—

discretion standard[,] . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
53. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160
(2010); see also Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13. For a discussion regarding
the potential of mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing, see
William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
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(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant, as set forth in the guidelines— . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 54

As noted above, the Guideline range is heavily influenced
by the offender’s criminal history score.55 The Guidelines also
expressly set out over three dozen considerations that can
affect the penalty and set out several considerations that
should not have an impact on penalty.56
In order to determine a sufficient but not excessive
sentence that is appropriate, the courts can factor in a
number of mitigating and aggravating considerations. They
come in two main forms. “Adjustments” are defined
considerations that increase or decrease the penalty by a
designated amount.57 For example, a demonstration of
remorse can result in a decreased penalty by up to two levels,
which can increase to three levels if it is accompanied by an
early guilty plea.58 The main adjustments relate to the
characteristics of the offender. As noted above, the prior
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
operation of this provision, see Berry, supra note 53; Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra
note 13.
55. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 388. Associated to this is that
reliance on criminal activity for livelihood is also aggravating (§ 4B1.3). It is
expressly stated that dismissed and uncharged conduct do not aggravate. Id. at
467.
56. For a historical overview of the development of aggravating and mitigating
considerations in the Guidelines see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 1-8.
57. These are set out in chapter 3 of the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 40, at 336-68.
58. Id. § 3E1.1. However, § 5K2.0 (d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart
from a guideline range as a result of “[t]he defendant’s decision, in and of itself,
to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the
offense (i.e., a departure may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant
decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be
based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court. See
§ 6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreement).” Id.
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criminal history of the offender can have a profound impact
on the penalty. However, other than this consideration, most
factors personal to the offender are intended to have only a
relatively minor impact on penalty. To this end, the
Guidelines provide:
Although the court must consider “the history and characteristics
of the defendant” among other factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in
order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the court should
not give them excessive weight. Generally, the most appropriate
use of specific offender characteristics is to consider them not as a
reason for a sentence outside the applicable guideline range but for
other reasons, such as in determining the sentence within the
applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or
imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the
applicable Zone on the Sentencing Table, and various other aspects
of an appropriate sentence. To avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct, see, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), the guideline range, which reflects the
defendant’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s criminal history,
should continue to be “the starting point and the initial
benchmark.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 59

The other main category of aggravating and mitigating
considerations is known as a “departure.” If a departure is
applicable, the court can more readily impose a sentence
outside the applicable guideline range. Moreover, the
Guidelines permit, in rare instances, considerations that are
not set out in the Guidelines to justify departing from the
guideline range.60 This means the range of aggravating and
mitigating considerations set out in the Guidelines is not
exhaustive. Where a court departs from the applicable
guideline range, it is required to state the reason for the
departure.61
I first provide an overview of the main aggravating
factors and then do the same in relation to the mitigating
factors. Prior to doing so, it is pertinent to note that there has
recently been a considered analysis of the operation of
59. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(B); see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
61. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.0(e).
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mitigating and aggravating factors in the Guidelines. 62
However, this analysis is empirical and descriptive in that it
collates data regarding the actual application of the
considerations by the courts. This type of analysis is useful
because it can expose failings in the law, for example, the
courts not properly applying the Guidelines as intended.
What is lacking is an attempt to inject coherency in the
aggravating and mitigating system—which is the primary
objective of this Article.
Apart from an offender’s prior criminal history, the most
wide-ranging aggravating factor is the offender’s role in the
offense. It is expressly stated that a sentence can be
increased if the offender is an organizer or leader or manager
of a criminal activity.63
The remaining aggravating factors can be divided into
three broad categories. The first is the manner in which the
offense is committed, which supposedly makes the crime
worse. A crime is made more serious if it involves any of the
following sixteen aspects:
 an abuse of a position of trust or use of special
skill;64
 use of a minor to commit a crime;65
 the use of body armor in the course of drug
trafficking crimes and crimes of violence;66
 terrorism;67
 a serious violation of human rights;68
 obstructing or impeding the administration of
justice;69
62. See Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13.
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 3B1.1(a).
64. Id. § 3B1.3.
65. Id. § 3B1.4.
66. Id. § 3B1.5.
67. Id. § 3A1.4.
68. Id. § 3A1.5.
69. Id. § 3C1.1.
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reckless endangerment during flight;70
committing an offense while on release;71
false registration of a domain name;72
extreme conduct (i.e., conduct that is unusually
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the
victim);73
 the
use
of
weapons
and
dangerous
instrumentalities;74
 the possession of a semi-automatic firearm in
connection with a crime of violence or controlled
substance offense;75
 being part of a violent street gang;76
 the crime was committed while the defendant
wore an official, or counterfeit official, insignia or
uniform;77
 abduction or unlawful restraint;78 or
 the crime being committed to conceal another
crime.79
There is no systematic attempt to explain the basis for
these considerations. Some factors would seem to have a
degree of intuitive appeal because they relate to conduct that
is manifestly seriously damaging. However, the utility of
many of the factors is unclear given that they relate to
conduct that is a separate offense (e.g., terrorism, abduction,
or the use of a firearm). In other cases it is unclear why the
factor makes the offense worse; for example, registering a
70. Id. § 3C1.2.
71. Id. § 3C1.3.
72. Id. § 3C1.4.
73. Id. § 5K2.8.
74. Id. § 5K2.6.
75. Id. § 5K2.17.
76. Id. § 5K2.18.
77. Id. § 5K2.24.
78. Id. § 5K2.4.
79. Id. § 5K2.9.
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false domain would not seem to be especially heinous and, in
some cases, the reference point of the consideration is
curious. For example, in relation to the second aggravating
factor—while it is tenable to argue that using a minor to
commit a crime makes the crime worse—committing a crime
against a minor is manifestly worse and consistency
commands that the later consideration should also be
included in the list.
There are four aggravating factors relating to the victim,
namely where:
 the offense is motivated by hate;80
 the victim is vulnerable;81
 the victim is an official;82 and
 the offense involved restraint of the victim.83
Once again, there is some intuitive appeal associated
with these considerations, but that is where the appeal seems
to end. It is not clear that a victim who is raped or assaulted
at random is any less damaged than one who is targeted
because of an attribute that prompts hatred by the offender.
And, certainly from the community’s point of view,
apparently random crimes can be more disturbing than
targeted offenses. Also, crimes against officials are
undesirable but at least the victims have an institutional
framework to support them. Hence, it is not clear that these
offenses are worse than those against other members of the
community.
The outcome of the offense can be aggravating. To this
end, the Guidelines expressly provide that if any of the
following six outcomes arise from an offense, an increase in
penalty is justified (and, possibly, a departure from the
presumptive range):

80. Id. § 3A1.1(a).
81. Id. § 3A1.1(b)(1).
82. Id. § 3A1.2.
83. Id. § 3A1.3.
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death;84
physical injury;85
extreme psychological injury;86
property damage or loss;87
disruption of governmental function;88 or
endangerment of national security, public health,
or safety.89
These harm-oriented aggravating circumstances are the
least controversial. As we shall see, they are justified by
reference to the principle of proportionality. While there are
twenty-nine aggravating considerations set out in the
Guidelines (including prior convictions and role in the
offense), there are considerably fewer mitigating factors—in
fact, only thirteen such factors exist. Partly the reason for
this is that “mitigating and aggravating factors do not
represent different sides of the same coin”.90 Thus, for
example, while a vulnerable victim increases the penalty, a
robust and resilient victim does not reduce the sanction. The
fact that there are more aggravating than mitigating factors
is also consistent with the trend in other jurisdictions in the
United States.91
The first mitigating category relates to the offender’s role
in the offense. A minor role in the offense can result in a
penalty reduction from two to four levels.92 Several other
considerations can mitigate because of the circumstances of
84. Id. § 5K2.1.
85. Id. § 5K2.2.
86. Id. § 5K2.3.
87. Id. § 5K2.5.
88. Id. § 5K2.7.
89. Id. § 5K2.14.
90. Roberts & Hough, supra note 41, at 183.
91. Hessick, supra note 41, at 1128-29 (noting that, “of the seventeen systems
that identify both aggravating and mitigating factors, twelve states identify more
aggravating than mitigating factors; three states identify more mitigating than
aggravating factors; and two states identify an equal number of aggravating and
mitigating factors.”).
92. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 3B1.2.
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the offense. In effect, these considerations relate to situations
which are grounded in criminal defenses but are not so
pronounced as to exculpate the offender. The considerations
are:
 where the offender committed the crime to avoid a
greater harm;93
 if the defendant committed the offense under
serious coercion or duress;94
 if the crime was committed when the offender was
experiencing reduced mental capacity;95 and
 where the offender was provoked by the victim.96
As discussed in Part VII, there is doctrinal justification
for most of these considerations but they need to be grounded
in a coherent theory.
The other remaining mitigating factors can be divided
into three categories. The first is the offender’s response to the
charge. Thus, the following considerations will reduce
penalty:
 if the offender voluntarily discloses the offense, which
was unlikely to be otherwise discovered;97
 if the offender provides substantial assistance to authorities;98 and
 if the offender demonstrates remorse (which can result in a decrease of penalty by up to two levels, and
can increase to three levels if it is accompanied by an
early guilty plea).99
93. Id. § 5K2.11.
94. Id. § 5K2.12. For a discussion of this consideration, see Baron-Evans &
Coffin, supra note 13, at 164-67.
95. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.13. For a discussion of this
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 164-74.
96. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.10.
97. Id. § 5K2.16.
98. Id. § 5K1.1. Thus, it can justify a departure from the guidelines. Refusal to
assist authorities is not aggravating. Id. § 5K1.2.
99. Id. § 3E1.1. However, § 5K2.0(d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart
from a guideline range as a result of
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All of these considerations are widely endorsed.
However, it is not apparent that remorse should reduce the
penalty given that it is a reasonable minimum expectation of
any citizen. This theme, as well as the appropriate reduction
for assisting authorities and pleading guilty, is discussed at
great length in Part IX of this Article.
Another category involves matters personal to the
offender. The following factors can reduce a penalty:
 prior clean record, except in relation to offenses
against children; and 100
 military service.101
It is unclear why military service should be singled out
as a mitigating consideration. While this is incontestably a
desirable activity, it is not manifestly more virtuous than
charity work or service as a nurse or other health
professional.
There are a number of considerations that can mitigate
because of the impact of the sanction on the offender. They
are:
 age;102
 mental and emotional condition;103 and/or
 physical condition.104

[t]he defendant’s decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense
or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure
may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead
guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based
on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the
court.
100. Id. § 5K2.20(a)-(b).
101. Id. § 5H1.11.
102. Id. § 5H1.1. For a discussion of this consideration factor being mitigatory,
see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 50-66.
103. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.3. For a discussion of this
consideration see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 70-84.
104. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.4. For a discussion of this
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 84-106.
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As discussed below, these factors are sound to the extent
that they relate to the harshness with which the sanction
impacts on the offender.
Factors in this category but expressly stipulated as not
being mitigatory are:
 drug or alcohol dependence or abuse and gambling
addiction;105
 employment record;106
 family ties and responsibilities;107
 race;108
 sex;109
 national origin;110
 creed;111
 religion;112
 socio-economic status;113
 civic, charitable, or public service; employmentrelated contributions;114

105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.4. For an argument in favor
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 95102, 104-05.
106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.5. For an argument in favor
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at
106-09.
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.6. For an argument in favor
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at
109-17.
108. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.10.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. For a discussion of this consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra
note 13, at 124-27
114. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.11. For a discussion of this
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 127-39.
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record of prior good works;115 and
lack of guidance as a youth and similar
circumstances.116
While the Guidelines stipulate that these factors should not
reduce a penalty, post-Booker this is not an obligatory
stipulation and, where relevant, judges can mitigate a
penalty for these reasons.117 As noted above, this list of
departures is not exhaustive. The Guidelines expressly state:
“The Commission recognizes that there may be other grounds
for departure that are not mentioned; it also believes there
may be cases in which a departure outside suggested levels
is warranted. In its view, however, such cases will be highly
infrequent.”118
Moreover, while in theory the express stipulation that
these factors should not mitigate is, in principle, desirable for
the purposes of clarity, the negation of several of these factors
as being capable of reducing penalty is questionable. In
particular, as is discussed in Parts VI to IX below, a sound
case can be made for socio-economic status and family ties to
mitigate.
B. Aggravation and Mitigation in Australia
In Australia, the situation is more expansive as far as the
number of aggravating and mitigating considerations is
concerned. Sentencing in each of the nine Australian
jurisdictions (i.e., the six states, the Northern Territory, the
Australian Capital Territory and the Federal jurisdiction) is
governed by a combination of legislation and the common
law. While sentencing law differs in each Australian
jurisdiction, considerable convergence exists in key areas.
For the purposes of this Article, the important point
regarding sentencing in Australia is that it is largely a
115. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.11. For a discussion of this
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 127-39.
116. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.12. For a discussion of this
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 139-47.
117. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364-65 (2007) (Stevens, J. concurring).
118. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 1A1.4(b).
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discretionary process, in which judges process potentially
hundreds of aggravating and mitigating considerations.
In contrast to the United States, fixed penalties for
serious offenses in Australia are rare.119 However, the overarching methodology and conceptual approach that
sentencing judges undertake in making sentencing decisions
is the same in each jurisdiction. This approach is known as
“instinctive synthesis.” The term originates from the forty
year-old Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria decision
of R v Williscroft.120 Justices Adam and Crockett stated: “Now,
ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing
judge’s instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects
involved in the punitive process.”121
The process of instinctive synthesis is a mechanism
whereby sentencers make a decision regarding all the
considerations relevant to sentencing and give due weight to
each of them (and, in the process, incorporate considerations
that incline to a heavier penalty and off-set against them
factors that favor a lesser penalty), then set a precise penalty.
The hallmark of this process is that it does not require (nor
permit) judges to set out with any particularity122 the weight
(in mathematical terms) accorded to any particular
consideration. A global judgment is made without recourse to
a step-wise process that demarcates the precise
considerations that influence the judgment. The general
methodology for reaching sentencing decisions has been
considered by the High Court of Australia on several
occasions. The Court has consistently adopted the instinctive
synthesis approach and rejected the alternative, which is
normally referred to as the two-step approach, which
involves setting an appropriate sentence commensurate with
the severity of the offense and making allowances up and

119. An example is people smuggling offenses. See, e.g., Migration Act 1958
(Cth), ss 233A–233C (Austl.).
120. R. v Williscroft [1975] VR 292.
121. Id. at 300.
122. With minor exceptions discussed in Part IV below.
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down in light of relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.123
The proportionality principle is adopted in all
jurisdictions. In Veen (No 1) v R124 and Veen (No 2) v R125 the
High Court stated that proportionality is the primary aim of
sentencing. It is considered so important that it cannot be
trumped even by the goal of community protection which, at
various times, has also been declared as the most important
aim of sentencing.126
Another important commonality in all Australian
jurisdictions is that aggravating and mitigating factors
operate relatively uniformly throughout the country, despite
the different ways in which they are dealt with by statute.
The considerations stem mainly from the common law and
are continually evolving. There are between 200 and 300
such factors.127 The large number of aggravating and
mitigating factors is a key reason why it is not possible to
predict with confidence the exact sentence that will be
imposed in any particular case.128 The unfettered
discretionary nature of Australian sentencing calculus is
similar to the largely uncontrolled sentencing process in
parts of the United States approximately fifty years ago,
which led Justice Marvel Frankel to describe the system as
“lawless.”129

123. See, e.g., Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, 28 (Austl.).
124. Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467.
125. See generally Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 (discussing all
factors properly considered to reach a proportionate sentence).
126. See, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433, 438.
127. See, e.g., Roger Douglas, Sentencing, in GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF
VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 62 (1980), in a study of Victorian Magistrates’
Courts, identified 292 relevant sentencing factors.
128. A similar regime exists in the United Kingdom. See generally Ashworth,
Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigating at Sentencing,
supra note 11, at 21-38.
129. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 48 (1972).
For a critique of Frankel’s impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin
Frankel’s Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKLEY J.
CRIM. L. 239, 254-57 (2009).
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Like the situation in the United States, there is no
established or accepted theory of what should constitute
mitigating and aggravating consideration. Most of these
factors are defined by the common law, and some legislative
schemes set out a number of mitigating and aggravating
considerations. The most expansive scheme to this end, is
that in New South Wales pursuant to section 21A(2) of the
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.130 The list here
provides a useful comparison to those in the U.S. Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.131 Broadly, the considerations can be
divided into the same categories as those discussed in the
United States context.
I again consider aggravating factors first. The offender’s
prior criminality is, once again, an aggravating factor, and it
is expressly stated that it is especially the case in relation to
serious personal violence offenses.132
The first broad category of aggravation is the manner in
which the offense is committed. A crime is made more serious
if it involves any of the nineteen following aspects:
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use
of violence;133
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use
of a weapon;134
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use
of explosives or a chemical or biological agent;135
 the offense was committed in company;136
 the offense was committed in the presence of a
child under 18 years of age;137

130. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, (NSW) s 21A(2)(d) (Austl.).
131. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40.
132. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, supra note 130, s 21A(2)(d).
133. Id. s 21A(2)(b).
134. Id. s 21A(2)(c).
135. Id. s 21A(2)(ca).
136. Id. s 21A(2)(e).
137. Id. s 21A(2)(ea).
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the offense involved the offender causing the
victim to take, inhale or be affected by a narcotic
drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating
substance;138
the offense was committed in the home of the
victim or any other person;139
the offense involved gratuitous cruelty;140
the offense was motivated by prejudicial hate;141
the offense was committed without regard to
public safety;142
the offense involved a risk to national security;143
the offense involved a grave risk of death to
another person;144
the offense was committed while the offender was
on conditional liberty;145
the offender abused a position of trust or authority
in relation to the victim;146
the offense involved multiple victims or a series of
criminal acts;147
the offense was committed for financial gain;148
the offense was a traffic offense and was
committed with a passenger under sixteen years
of age;149

138. Id. s 21A(2)(cb).
139. Id. s 21A(2)(eb).
140. Id. s 21A(2)(f).
141. Id. s 21A(2)(h).
142. Id. s 21A(2)(i).
143. Id. s 21A(2)(ia).
144. Id. s 21A(2)(ib).
145. Id. s 21A(2)(j).
146. Id. s 21A(2)(k).
147. Id. s 21A(2)(m).
148. Id. s 21A(2)(o).
149. Id. s 21A(2)(p).
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the offense was planned;150 or
the offense was committed in the course of
organized criminal activity.151
There are two aggravating factors relating to the victim,
namely:
 the victim was a public official;152 and
 the victim was vulnerable. 153
The outcome of the offense can also be aggravating;154
however, no such considerations are set out in the legislation.
Unlike the situation in the United States, there are
roughly the same number of mitigating considerations as
aggravating factors in Australia. The first mitigating
category relates to the circumstances of the offense. In effect,
these considerations relate to situations which are grounded
in criminal defenses but were not so extreme as to exculpate
the offender. The considerations are:
 the offender was provoked by the victim;155
 the offender was acting under duress;156 and
 the offender was not fully aware of the
consequences of his or her actions because of the
offender’s age or any disability. 157
The second mitigating category is the offender’s response
to the charge. Thus, the following considerations will reduce
penalty:
 remorse shown by the offender;158
150. Id. s 21A(2)(n).
151. Id.
152. Id. s 21A(2)(a).
153. Id. s 21A(2)(l).
154. MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA 231-36 (2013)
[hereinafter BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA].
155. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 21A(3)(c).
156. Id. s 21A(3)(d).
157. Id. s 21A(3)(j).
158. Id. s 21A(3)(i).
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a plea of guilty;159
meaningful pre-trial disclosure (which attenuates
the duration of any trial); 160 and
 assistance to law enforcement authorities. 161
Another category is matters personal to the offender. The
following factors can reduce penalty:
 the offender does not have significant previous
convictions;162
 the offender was a person of good character;163
 the offender is unlikely to re-offend;164 or
 the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation.165
Unlike the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
there is greater alignment between aggravating and
mitigating factors. In some cases, the absence of an
aggravating factor is mitigating. Thus, mitigation is
warranted where:
 the injury, emotional harm, loss, or damage
caused by the offense was not substantial;166 and
 the offense was not part of a planned or organized
criminal activity.167
The factors, while relatively extensive, do not come close
to exhausting the range of mitigating and aggravating
considerations. Other mitigating factors include: voluntary
cessation of offending;168 voluntary disclosure of crime;169
159. Id. s 21A(3)(k).
160. Id. s 21A(3)(l).
161. Id. s 21A(3)(m).
162. Id. s 21A(3)(e).
163. Id. s 21A(3)(f).
164. Id. s 21A(3)(g).
165. Id. s 21A(3)(h).
166. Id. s 21A(3)(a).
167. Id. s 21A(3)(b).
168. R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273 (Austl.).
169. DPC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 395 (Austl.).
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onerous prison conditions related to the personal factors of
the offender (e.g., nature of the offense and mental
condition);170 poor health;171 and public opprobrium directed
towards the offender as a result of the offense.172 Additional
aggravating considerations are: being part of a gang;173
committing a well-planned offense;174 and committing a crime
which is prevalent.175
Moreover, the list of aggravating and mitigating
considerations in Australia is never closed. It is constantly
developing as more are continually added to the list, and
often there is a lack of clarity regarding the status of
emerging considerations. A few examples illustrate the point.
Offenders who are not Australian citizens risk deportation if
they fail a “character test”, which occurs, among other
circumstances, if a person is sentenced to imprisonment for a
year or more.176 Deportation is an additional burden that
would be faced by the offender and hence, arguably, it should
be mitigatory. That was the position taken in
Valayamkandathil v The Queen;177 Guden v The Queen178 and
Director of Public Prosecutions v Yildirim.179 However, a
different position was taken in Ponniah v The Queen.180

170. Tognolini v The Queen [2012] (No. 2) VSCA 311 (Austl.); see also R v Puc
[2008] VSCA 159 (Austl.); Western Australia v O’Kane [2011] WASCA 24.
171. Dosen v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 283 (Austl.); AWP v The Queen [2012]
VSCA 41 (Austl.).
172. Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 267 (Austl.)
173. R v Quin [2009] NSWCCA 16 (Austl.).
174. R v Yildiz [2006] 160 A Crim R 218 (Austl.); R v Douglas [2004] 146 A Crim
R 590 (Austl.).
175. Braslin v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1 (Austl.). For recent discussions
about key mitigating factors, see BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA,
supra note 154, at 273-75, 310-51.
176. Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501; JOHN VRACHNAS
REFUGEE LAW 160 (3d ed., 2012).
177. [2010] VSCA 260 [28] (Austl.).
178. [2010] VSCA 196 [29] (Austl.).
179. [2011] VSCA 219 (Austl.).
180. [2011] WASCA 105 [48] (Austl.).
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In Victoria, it has been held that the consent of a child
sex victim does not mitigate a penalty in relation to child sex
cases.181 A different approach is taken in Western
Australia.182
In Avdic v The Queen the Victorian Court of Appeal held
that an offender who was pregnant at the time of sentence
with her first child was not entitled to a sentencing discount
on account of the fact that she would be required to raise the
child in the prison setting.183 To this end, the Court simply
stated:
The evidence on the plea was that she would be accommodated in a
special unit for mothers of young children. I am not satisfied that
the evidence before the sentencing judge demonstrated that her
pregnancy would render imprisonment more burdensome than for
other prisoners. This is not a case where the appellant will be
separated from her child by reason of imprisonment. 184

In Hancock v The Queen the same Court recognized that
pregnancy could be a mitigating factor.185 The decisions are
barely a year apart. In Hancock there is no reference to Avdic,
underlining the lack of rigor in this area of law.186
C. Overview of Comparison of Aggravation and Mitigation
in the United States and Australia
The above discussion highlights the range and, in the
case of Australia, the near limitless number of considerations
that aggravate and mitigate penalty. There is some overlap
in relation to these considerations; however, the
dissimilarities are profound and at several different levels.
The first is the contrast in the type of considerations that
impact sentence. The prominent considerations in Australia
that affect sentence which are not recognized in the United
181. Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157 (Austl.).
182. R v SJH [2010] WASCA 40 (Austl.).
183. [2012] VSCA 172 [21] (Austl.).
184. [2012] VSCA 172, [21] (Austl.).
185. [2013] VSCA 199 (Austl.).
186. Id.
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States include: burdensome prison conditions; a significant
delay between the time of charging and sentence; 187
incidental hardships stemming from the crime, such as
public opprobrium;188 an injury sustained while committing
the offense;189 forgiveness of the victim;190 and pleading guilty
(even when not associated with remorse).
The contrast is so stark in some cases that considerations
which positively mitigate penalty in Australia are expressly
repudiated as being capable of reducing penalty in the United
States. Examples of this relate to social and economic
deprivation, the cultural background of the offender,191 and
the impact of the sentence on the offender’s family. The
converse is also true—using a domain name to commit an
offense or previous military service are not recognized
sentencing factors in Australia.
The second dissimilarity is not so obvious, but is perhaps
more significant. While there is a degree of overlap between
some of the sentencing considerations, the weight accorded
to them and, hence, their capacity to impact sentence is
profoundly different. A clear illustration of this relates to
prior convictions. As noted above, in the United States they
can drastically increase penalty severity—by over a decade.192
However, in Australia, prior convictions are only relevant to
the extent of denying an offender a discount that would be
associated with prior good behavior and, hence, cannot be
used as the basis for increasing a penalty above that which is
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.193 Other
examples include discounts associated with pleading guilty
and assisting authorities. In Australia, they are generally
187. R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517, 522 (Austl.).
188. Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 267 (Austl.).
189. R v Hannigan [2009] 193 A Crim R 399 (Austl.).
190. Marsh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 6 (Austl.).
191. See e.g., Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 (Austl.).
192. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior
Convictions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact
Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343
[hereinafter Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime].
193. R v Baumer [1988] 166 CLR 51, 58 (Austl.).
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regarded as the most compelling sentencing considerations
and can lead to discounts in the order of twenty-five percent
and fifty percent, respectively.194 By contrast, in the United
States, they are given far less weight. In Australia, as a
general rule, the impact of aggravating and mitigating
considerations is far more discretionary and unpredictable
than in the United States. Apart from the discounts for
pleading guilty and assisting authorities, the courts do not
specify the weight accorded to any aggravating or mitigating
considerations. That is a matter for the judge and hence any
consideration can be given, say, 5% or 40% emphasis without
the judge falling into error.
There are, of course, differences to be expected when
comparing any sentencing systems. Sentencing is a complex
dynamic which is deeply influenced by political, social,
cultural and economic situations. However, the United
States and Australia are flourishing, wealthy, highlyeducated countries with the capacity to make informed,
intelligent and evidence-based public policy decisions.
Moreover, the systems of both countries have the same
fundamental aims: to reduce crime, impose proportionate
penalties and achieve the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation
and incapacitation. Thus, a degree of convergence in relation
to fundamental sentencing considerations would be expected.
It does not exist, however, in relation to aggravating and
mitigating considerations because of the absence of doctrinal
coherency in this area. The remainder of this Article
attempts to remedy the existing intellectual and policy
deficit.
III. CURRENT METHODOLOGY REGARDING AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS IS FLAWED
The jurisprudence on the explanation and justification of
aggravating and mitigating factors is sparse and weak. There
are few cases or commentaries that attempt anything
approaching a detailed or serious evaluation of the nature or
meaning of aggravating or mitigating factors. Typically,
194. BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING
304-10.
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when judges apply such considerations, they assume their
existence and when the concepts are discussed in a wider
context they are done so in a perfunctory manner.195
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has not
developed an over-arching theory of mitigation. To the extent
that it has considered these concepts, the emphasis has been
on mitigation and, to this end, it has mainly been in relation
to capital cases.196 The concept has been applied in a broad
manner (without any attempt to define the term).197 For
example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice O’Connor simply
stated that mitigating factors are considerations which
reduce the culpability of a defendant.198
In a similar vein are the comments of Justice Basten in
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal decision of
Elyard v R, where he stated:
Terms such as “aggravating factors” and “mitigating factors”, have
a long history of use in this area of the law. Depending on context,
usage may vary, but one common intention is to identify those
circumstances which may tend to place a particular offense towards
the upper or lower ends of a range of moral culpability.199

One of the few cases that examined the concept of
aggravation or mitigation in any detail is the Director of
Public Prosecutions v England.200 The offender pleaded guilty
to murder in circumstances where, after the killing, he
195. See Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and
Mitigating at Sentencing, supra note 11, at 27-28; ALLAN MASON, The Search for
Principles: Integrating Cultural Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT
SENTENCING 40, 40-43 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
196. See Jeffrey L Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346-48 (1998).
197. This is reflected in the comment by Justice O’Connor in California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987).
198. 492 U.S. 302, 337-38 (1989); see also Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-608
(1978) (noting that relevant mitigating factors must be considered to meet
constitutional requirements for death penalty statutes).
199. [2006] NSWCCA 43 [4] (Austl.).
200. [1999] 2 VR 258 (Austl.). The decision was relied upon in R v Quarry [2005]
11 VR 337, 346 per Batt JA (Austl.).
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defiled the body.201 On appeal, a central matter for the
Victorian Court of Appeal was whether the post-offense
conduct could be an aggravating factor.202
In resolving the issue, Justice Brooking first noted that,
“aggravating circumstances point towards greater severity of
sentence.”203 The complexity in this case was that the
aggravating conduct had occurred after the offense had been
completed. To justify this conduct as an independent
aggravating factor, Justice Brooking relied upon the notion
of a “common sense” or “moral sense.” His Honor held:
Long before the Sentencing Act rose above the horizon judges drew
on their common sense and their moral sense, as representing that
of the community, in deciding what things about a crime could be
said to make it more or less serious.204 They still do; nothing in the
Act stops them from doing this. Common sense and moral sense,
which are and must ever be the essential foundation of sentencing
principles and practices, unite in rejecting the notion that “the
circumstances of the offense”, for sentencing purposes, are neatly
marked out by two lines, one at the technical beginning and the
other at the technical end of the crime.205

This approach is singularly unhelpful. In a system
governed by rules, standards developed on the basis of
common sense or (an undisclosed) moral sense are repugnant
to basal rule of law virtues.206
Thus, the Courts have provided little doctrinal guidance
regarding the concept of mitigation or aggravation. The same

201. Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 VR 258.
202. Id.
203. Id. A similar approach to that of Justice Brooking in Director of Public
Prosecutions, which also relied upon “common sense,” was evident in R v Basso
[1999] 108 A Crim R 392 [24 (Austl.), where Justice Chernov opined that in
respect of offenses committed while on bail: “In my view, as a matter of common
sense, the commission of an offense in breach of such a condition constitutes an
aggravating factor, which can be taken into account by the sentencing judge in
determining the appropriate sentence.”
204. Basso [1999] 108 A Crim R 392 [23].
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. See JOEL FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-76 (1980); JOSEPH
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 210-29 (1979).
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applies in relation to scholarly works. In relation to
mitigating factors, Hyman Gross207 has noted that:
It is no easy matter to decide what shall count as a good reason in
mitigation of sentence [in fairness to him, what a man has done
that rebounds to his credit ought sometimes to be admitted to
counterbalance the crime that now rebounds to his
discredit] . . . Because we are civilized . . . our moral life includes
many different sorts of things, and in meting out punishment for
crime we need to go beyond the simple justice of desert and show
respect as well for other things of value.
In the first place there are sometimes larger considerations of
justice whose influence makes itself felt. . . . The acts of a good
citizen and even a virtuous human being often have a proper place
and count in his favour in deciding on his sentence. Still, not every
kind of creditable activity is properly taken into account or
consideration and we find it difficult to decide where to draw the
line.
Apart from justice there is mercy. . . . Sometimes compassion is not
a matter of mercy but a matter of right. When suffering would be
cruel, the sentence must be mitigated to prevent that. . . . Finally,
there are reasons of expediency that seem to warrant mitigation.
We wish to encourage those apprehended to cooperate in bringing
others to justice, and so we reward their co-operation with lighter
sentences than they would otherwise receive.208

The problem with this approach is that it is too obscure.
Reliance on broad and obscure concepts such as “fairness”,
“virtue”, “mercy”, and “justice” provides no scope for guidance
in distinguishing considerations which are genuinely
mitigatory (or aggravating) from those which are not.
IV. TOWARDS A RATIONAL THEORY
In order to understand the scope and nature of
aggravating and mitigating considerations, it is necessary to
develop a top-down theory.209
207. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL J USTICE 451-52 (1978).
208. Id.
209. The most informative examination of this issue is by Ashworth, Reevaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigating at Sentencing, supra
note 11, at 21; however, his discussion focuses on the extent to which existing
aggravating and mitigating factors fit within current orthodoxy as opposed to
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As noted above, according to existing orthodoxy,
considerations which lower a penalty can be divided into four
categories: the circumstances of the offense; the offender’s
response to a charge; matters personal to the offender; and
the impact of the sanction on the offender and his or her
dependents. As far as factors that increase penalty, the
categories are: the offender’s criminal history; the manner in
which the offense was committed; the nature of the victim;
and the outcome of the offense.210
While that is the conventional manner in which
aggravating and mitigating considerations are categorized, it
stems from a desire for expediency rather than an approach
derived from conceptual interrogation. The existing
classifications provide a neat and orderly methodology for
lawyers and judges who need to identify and catalogue
established aggravating and mitigating considerations;
however, they do not give any insight into the possible
rationale and foundation for the considerations.
The more illuminating pathway to explaining and
justifying aggravating and mitigating considerations is to
place them in the multi-dimensional institutional construct
within which they operate. In terms of the increasing breadth
of operation, there are three such institutions. The first is the
sentencing system. This system does not exist in a vacuum
and is subsumed within the broader system of criminal
justice and the over-arching system of law and justice. Hence,
the second perspective is the criminal justice system, and the
third is the legal system in general. As we shall see, the
objectives of these systems are not always identical.
The starting point in grounding aggravating and
mitigating considerations is that they should be abolished
unless a cogent justification is given in light of the objectives
of these three institutions. I commence this inquiry by
focusing on the sentencing system.

whether they are justifiable against the backdrop of an over-arching coherent
theory.
210. See supra Part II.A.
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V. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING FROM
THE SENTENCING SYSTEM
The most narrow reference point in developing
aggravating and mitigating factors is the sentencing system.
From this perspective a consideration should only operate to
increase or decrease penalty if it promotes a sentencing
objective which itself is justified. In order to ascertain which
sentencing aims are valid, it is necessary to contextualize the
analysis against a slightly broader doctrinal backdrop.
Punishment is a study of the connection between wrongdoing
and state-imposed sanctions. The main issue raised by the
concept of punishment is the basis upon which the evils
administered by the state to offenders can be justified. Thus,
sentencing and punishment are inextricably linked, with
punishment being the logically prior inquiry. In order to
properly decide how, and how much, to punish, it must first
be established on what basis punishment is justified and why
we are punishing.211
A. Both Theories of Punishment Incline to the Same
Sentencing Objectives
As noted earlier, there are two main theories of
punishment.212 Utilitarians argue that punishment is
justified because the pain stemming from the sanction is
outweighed by the good consequences stemming from it.213
The consequences are traditionally thought to come in the
form of incapacitation (i.e., imprisoning offenders and
thereby preventing them from further offending), deterrence
(i.e., discouraging further offending), and rehabilitation (i.e.,
inducing positive attitudinal reform).214 The utilitarian
211. See HERBERT L. PACKER, Theories of Punishment and Correction: What is
the Function of Prison?, in JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL
PROCESS 183, 183-89 (Leonard Orland ed., 1973).
212. See supra Part I.
213. MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 43
(2001) [hereinafter BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING].
214. See Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism,
supra note 2, at 134-39.
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theory of punishment has fallen out of favor for two main
reasons. The first is the perceived inability of the sentencing
process to achieve the utilitarian penal objectives of
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.215 The second
is the view that utilitarianism could lead to abhorrent
practices, such as punishing the innocent.216
The main competing theory, and the one which enjoys the
most contemporary support, is retributivism. Retributive
theories of punishment are not clearly defined and it is
difficult to isolate a common thread running through theories
carrying this label.217 All retributive theories assert that
offenders deserve to suffer, and that the institution of
punishment should inflict the suffering they deserve.
However, they provide divergent accounts of why criminals
deserve to suffer.218
While retributivism is the orthodox theory of
punishment, I have previously argued that it is doctrinally
flawed principally because it can only justify punishment by
reference to consequential benefits stemming from
punishment, mainly in the form of deterring crime.219 I have
also argued that the criticisms of a utilitarian theory of
punishment have been over-stated and that, in fact,
utilitarianism is the most persuasive theory of
punishment.220
Irrespective of which theory is the most sound, it is
important to note that the practical implications from each of
the theories are theoretically not as significant as may seem
to be the case. As a result of the empirical data regarding the
efficacy of punishment to achieve stated utilitarian objectives
215. See A.E. BOTTOMS, An Introduction to the Coming Crisis, in THE COMING
PENAL CRISIS: A CRIMINOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION 8-15 (A.E.
Bottoms & R.H. Preston eds., 1980).
216. See EDGAR FREDERICK CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947);
HENRY JOHN MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 181 (1969).
217. See HONDERICH, supra note 17, at 211; David Dolinko, Retributivism,
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHILOSOPHY
507, 515 (1997).
218. See Anthony Duff & Andrew Von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and
the “Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103, 107 (1997).
219. See BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING, supra note 213, at 158.
220. Id.
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of punishment, it emerges that, in fact, there is no
meaningful pragmatic difference between retributivism and
utilitarianism so far as the design of a rational sentencing
system is concerned. As noted below, the key focus of
retributivism is to ensure there is proportionality between
the punishment and the crime. Such matching is potentially
distorted in a utilitarian calculus by the need to achieve other
objectives, namely, general deterrence, specific deterrence,
and rehabilitation. However, as is noted shortly, punishment
is largely incapable of achieving these objectives and hence
the amount of punishment should not be influenced by those
considerations. Both theories endorse the pursuit of
proportionate sentences as a principle sentencing
requirement.221 The potential theoretical divergence between
the key theories of punishment has been negated by what the
empirical data show can be achieved through sentencing.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to explore this philosophical
realm further for the purposes of this Article.
The overlap between the retributive and utilitarian aims
was noted by the United States Federal Sentencing
Commission, which stated:
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal
punishment. Most observers of the criminal law agree that the
ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is
the control of crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus
seems to break down. Some argue that appropriate punishment
should be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of “just
deserts.” Under this principle, punishment should be scaled to the
offender’s culpability and the resulting harms. Others argue that
punishment should be imposed primarily on the basis of practical
“crime control” considerations. This theory [utilitarianism] calls for
sentences that most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime,
either by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.
Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to
choose between them and accord one primacy over the other. As a
practical matter, however, this choice was unnecessary because in

221. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in
Sentencing, 25 N.Z.U.L. REV. 411, 419, 423-24 (2013) [hereinafter Bagaric,
Injecting Content].
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most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will
produce the same or similar results.222

B. The Objectives of Punishment Do Not Have a Significant
Impact on the Development of Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors
While the choice of punishment theory does not impact
heavily on the selection of aggravating and mitigating
factors, the decision regarding which objectives of sentencing
to pursue can potentially strongly influence the development
of such factors. For example, if rehabilitation is a valid aim
of sentencing, considerations such as youth and remorse
could reduce penalty severity.223 In order to ascertain the
appropriateness of established sentencing objectives to guide
the sentencing landscape, it is necessary to determine the
validity of these objectives.
There is a mass of empirical data focusing on the efficacy
of sentencing to achieve the main goals of sentencing.
Fortunately, the trend of the findings has been analyzed
recently and is relatively consistent, hence it is possible to
provide an overview of conclusions in the recent literature. In
short, current empirical evidence provides no basis for
confidence that sentencing is capable of achieving most of the
goals of sentencing and hence they should not drive the
selection of aggravating and mitigating considerations.224 The
one exception to this is the incapacitation of serious sexual
and violent offenders. I now consider each of the objectives
more closely.

222. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. (2013).
223. This, of course, assumes that younger offenders and those who are contrite
are less likely to re-offend.
224. See generally Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing,
supra note 14.
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1. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work. Specific deterrence
aims to reduce the incidence of crime by punishing offenders
and thereby illustrating to them the negative effects of
crime.225 It is assumed that this experience will be so adverse
that they will seek to avoid it in the future.226 The available
empirical data suggest that specific deterrence does not
work, so inflicting less severe sanctions on offenders than
imprisonment will not make them more likely to re-offend in
the future. The level of certainty of this conclusion is very
high, so high that specific deterrence should be abolished as
a sentencing consideration so it cannot influence the
development of aggravating and mitigating considerations.
There are numerous studies across a wide range of
jurisdictions and different time periods that have come to
this conclusion.227 Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen and
Cheryl L. Jonson provide the most recent extensive literature
review regarding specific deterrence.228 They reviewed the
impact of custodial sanctions versus non-custodial sanctions
and the effect of sentence length on re-offending.229 The
review examined six experimental studies where custodial
versus non-custodial sentences were randomly assigned;230
eleven studies which involved matched pairs;231 thirty-one
studies which were regression based;232 and seven other
studies which did not neatly fit into any of those three
225. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to
Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work,
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159, 159
(2012).
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Re-offending, 38 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 143-77 (2009); see also DONALD RITCHIE,
SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF THE
EVIDENCE (2011); DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE
SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING (2009).
229. Nagin et al., supra note 226, at 143.
230. Id. at 144-47.
231. Id. at 145, 148-53.
232. Id. at 154-62.

2014]

MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION

1201

categories and included naturally occurring social
experiments which allowed inferences to be drawn regarding
the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.233
Nagin et al. suggest that offenders who are sentenced to
imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than
those who receive a non-custodial penalty and, in fact, that
some studies show the rate of recidivism among offenders
sentenced to imprisonment to be higher. They conclude that:
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies
point more toward a criminogenic [that is, the possible corrupting
effects of punishment] rather than preventive effect of custodial
sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak
because it is based on only a small number of studies, and many of
the point estimates are not statistically significant. 234

Recent studies are consistent with this conclusion.235
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that
subjecting offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to
increase the prospect that they will become law-abiding
citizens in the future. It follows that the goal of specific
deterrence cannot be achieved by the imposition of criminal
sanctions and should not influence sentencing practice and,
in particular, the choice of aggravating factors. It is futile to
increase penalties with the aim of decreasing the likelihood
that offenders will re-offend in the future—any aggravating
factors based on this objective should be abolished. In
particular, it is commonly regarded that offenders with
criminal histories should receive increasingly heavier
penalties in order to emphasize with greater force that crime
is inappropriate. The empirical evidence debunks this
approach.

233. Id. at 155, 163-67.
234. Id. at 145.
235. See Donald P. Green and Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments
to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug
Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 357-58 (2010); see also FRANKLIN ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 245 (1973)
[hereinafter ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL].
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2. General Deterrence (Also) Does Not Work. The main
form of deterrence used to justify harsher penalties is general
deterrence. General deterrence seeks to dissuade potential
offenders from committing similar offenses with the threat of
anticipated punishment by illustrating the harsh
consequences of offending.236
There are two forms of general deterrence. Marginal
general deterrence concerns the correlation between the
severity of the sanction and the prevalence of an offense.237 It
is a commonly-invoked objective used to justify heavier
sanctions being invoked, especially for crimes that are
planned and have a profit motive, such as drug trafficking
and white collar offending.238 Absolute general deterrence
concerns the threshold question of whether there is any
connection between criminal sanctions, of whatever nature,
and the incidence of criminal conduct.239 The evidence
suggests that marginal deterrence does not work, while
absolute general deterrence does work.240
The findings regarding general deterrence are relatively
settled.241 The existing data show that in the absence of the
threat of punishment for criminal conduct, the social fabric
of society would readily dissipate; crime would escalate and
overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of people to lead
happy and fulfilled lives. Thus, general deterrence works in
the absolute sense: there is a connection between criminal
sanctions and criminal conduct. However, there is
insufficient evidence to support a direct correlation between
higher penalties and a reduction in the crime rate.242 It
236. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
CONTROL, supra note 235.
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237. See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence
Doesn’t Work—and What it Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269, 270 (2011)
[hereinafter Bagaric & Alexander, General Deterrence Doesn’t Work].
238. Id. at 271.
239. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
CONTROL, supra note 235, at 14.
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240. For an overview of the literature, see RITCHIE, supra note 228.
241. For an overview of the literature, see id.
242. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60-61, 191 (1969);
see also Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A
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follows that marginal deterrence should be disregarded as a
sentencing objective, at least unless and until there is proof
that it works.243
It is counter-intuitive to suggest that higher penalties
will not reduce the crime rate. However, the evidence is
relatively definitive. Several reasons have been advanced to
explain this reality. The most obvious explanation is that the
risks of hardship and pain occasioned by criminal offending
are not adequately transmitted to potential offenders.244 In
other words, there is a failure of “threat communication” as
it affects risk perception and negatively impacts crime
rates.245 Yet, studies repeatedly show that awareness of
potentially severe sanctions does not produce less crime. In
one of the most wide-ranging studies of its type, 1,500
respondents in fifty-four large urban countries were
interviewed to assess whether respondents had higher
estimates of the certainty and severity of punishment and its
timeliness (celerity) in jurisdictions where the levels were, in
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569, 569 (2001); John K.
Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s
Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dieter Dölling et
al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of Meta-Analysis of Punishment, 15 EUR. J.
CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 201, 201 (2009); John J. Donohue III, Assessing the Relative
Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change over the Previous Decades and the
Benefits on the Margin, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF THE PRISON BOOM 269, 303 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009);
Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143,
143 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell
in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 163, 177-179 (2004); William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and
Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 419, 422 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000); Paul R. Zimmerman, State
Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 163
(2004); see generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel
Wallman eds., 2000).
243. See Bagaric & Alexander, General Deterrence Doesn’t Work, supra note 235.
244. For a discussion of the obstacles confronting this level of knowledge, see
Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
245. See Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the
Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 15-19
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
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fact, higher.246 No such link was established.247 The authors of
the study noted that this is irrespective of whether the
respondents had prior convictions or no prior experience with
the criminal justice system.248 They concluded that:
There is generally no significant association between perceptions of
punishment levels and actual levels that CJS [criminal justice
system] agencies work hard to achieve, implying that increases in
punishment levels do not routinely reduce crime through general
deterrence mechanisms. Increases in punishment might do so
through incapacitative effects, the effects of treatment programs
linked with punishment, or other mechanisms, but are not likely to
do so in any way that depends on producing changes in perceptions
of risk. . . . Thus, increased punishment levels are not likely to
increase deterrent effects, and decreased punishment levels are not
likely to decrease deterrent effects. 249

A second explanation is that higher sentences do nothing
to address the underlying causes of criminal behavior. The
deterrence argument is based on the economic rationalist
theory of choice; it assumes that offenders rationally choose
to offend in a type of criminological cost/benefit calculation.
Of course, sociologists argue that this theory fails to account
for the myriad reasons that predispose some individuals, and
some groups, to crime. As Henry observes:
[M]uch of the criminological literature has demonstrated that there
are a variety of motivations that shape criminal activity ranging
from biological predispositions, psychological personality traits,
social learning, cognitive thinking, geographical location and the
ecology of place, relative deprivation and the strain of capitalist
society, political conflict and social and sub-cultural meaning.250

246. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (2005).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 654-55.
249. Id. at 653-54; see also Christopher Watling et al., Applying Stafford and
Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence Theory to Drug Driving: Can it Predict
Those Likely to Offend? 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 452, 456-57
(2010).
250. Stuart Henry, Professor and Chair of Interdisciplinary Studies, Coll. of
Urban, Labor, and Metro. Affairs, Wayne State Univ., On the Effectiveness of
Prison as Punishment, Paper Presented at the Conference: Incarceration Nation:
The Warehousing of America’s Poor (Oct. 24, 2003) (emphasis added).
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In any event, irrespective of the reasons for the failure of
marginal general deterrence, it follows that penalties should
not be increased with the aim to deter potential offenders
from committing crime.
Thus, deterrence properly informs sentencing only to the
extent that it requires a hardship to be imposed for criminal
offending. It does not require a particularly burdensome
penalty, merely one that people would seek to avoid. That
aim could be satisfied by a fine or a short prison term. There
is no foundation for increasing penalties to reduce the crime
rate.
3. Rehabilitation—Evidence Not Conclusive Enough to
Justify Its Pursuit. Unlike the other key sentencing goals
analyzed above, rehabilitation serves normally to decrease
rather than increase penalty severity251 and, hence, is a
mitigating factor. If rehabilitation is a valid objective,
intuitively, it would justify reducing penalties in
circumstances where offenders are young, remorseful or have
taken active and positive steps to overcome the influences
that underpinned their offending.
Following extensive research conducted between 1960
and 1974, Robert Martinson, in an influential paper,
concluded that empirical studies had not established that
any rehabilitative programs had worked in reducing
recidivism.252 The Panel of the National Research Council in
the United States, several years after this work, also noted
there were no significant differences between the subsequent
recidivism rates of offenders regardless of the form of
punishment.253 They concluded, “[t]his suggests that neither
rehabilitative nor criminogenic effects operate very
strongly.”254

251. This generalization is not necessarily correct. As noted below, it seems that
rehabilitation programs can, in some instances, be effective in a custodial setting.
252. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974).
253. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 66 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
254. Id.
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The most recent wide-ranging Australian study
regarding the effectiveness of rehabilitation is a report by
Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre for the
Australian Institute of Criminology, published in 2011.255
The report focused on changes and improvements to prisonbased correction rehabilitation programs in the custodial
environment since 2004, when the previous report was
issued.256 The report summarized recent cross-jurisdictional
studies into the effectiveness of certain rehabilitation
programs.257 It noted that while there were mixed results,
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes.258
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender
programs, where some studies showed that the recidivism
rate of offenders completing the program was about half that
of other offenders.259 The results of programs directed
towards violent offenders were less positive, but a wideranging review of studies focusing on United Kingdom
programs noted reductions in violent offenses of around
seven to eight percent had occurred.260 There is no cogent
evidence supporting the effectiveness of domestic violence or
255. KAREN HESELTINE ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, PRISON-BASED
CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER REHABILITATION PROGRAMS: THE 2009 NATIONAL
PICTURE IN AUSTRALIA (2011), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/
5/6/4/%7b564B2ECA-4433-4E9B-B4BA-29BD59071E81%7drpp112.pdf; see also
DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS: REDUCING THE
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS AND DELINQUENTS (2006).
256. HESELTINE ET AL., supra note 255, at 2.
257. Id. at ix.
258. See id. at 14-31.
259. See LEON BAKKER ET AL., N.Z. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, AND THERE WAS
LIGHT . . . EVALUATING THE KIA MARAMA TREATMENT PROGRAMME FOR NEW
ZEALAND SEX OFFENDERS AGAINST CHILDREN 2 (2007), available at
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/665635/kiamarama.p
df; R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project
on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL
ABUSE 169, 169 (2002).
260. DARRICK JOLLIFFE & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, A
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS WITH VIOLENT OFFENDERS, at iii (2007),
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100505212400/http://
www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/review-evidence-violent.pdf.
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victim awareness programs.261 However, drug and alcohol
programs have been shown to be effective at reducing
substance abuse and re-offending.262
This assessment is consistent with the findings of
Ojmarrh Mitchell, David B. Wilson and Doris L. MacKenzie,
who undertook a major analysis of studies into the
effectiveness of drug treatment programs in prison.263 The
studies they focused on related to drug users and compared
re-offending patterns of offenders who completed a drug
rehabilitation program with those who did not complete a
program, or completed only a minimum program, between
the years 1980 and 2004.264 They analyzed sixty-six studies
in total.265 The report concluded, “[o]verall, this meta-analytic
synthesis of evaluations of incarceration-based drug
treatment programs found that such programs are modestly
effective in reducing recidivism.”266 Moreover, it noted that
programs that dealt with the multiple problems of drug users
(termed therapeutic communities) were the most successful,
whereas there was no evidence to support good outcomes
associated with “boot camp” programs.267
A mechanism which seems to reduce recidivism is
undergoing a program of formal education.268 A RAND
Corporation study published in 2013269 concluded that
inmates who undertook correctional education programs had
a thirteen percent reduced risk of recidivating and that this

261. HESELTINE ET AL., supra note 255, at 22, 30.
262. Id. at 26-27.
263. OJMARRH MITCHELL ET AL., THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INCARCERATION-BASED DRUG TREATMENT ON CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR (2006), available at http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/
download/98.
264. Id. at 6.
265. Id. at 11.
266. Id. at 17.
267. Id. at 17-18.
268. LOIS M. DAVIS
EDUCATION (2013).
269. Id.
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increased to thirty percent for participants of high
school/GED programs.270
Thus, the weight of empirical data (though it is far from
uniform or consistent) suggests that rehabilitative programs
can reduce the likelihood of recidivism for certain types of
offenses, such as sex-offenders. However, the level of
knowledge regarding the impact of rehabilitative programs
on recidivism rates is so small that no policy or legal changes
should be made at this point as far as rehabilitation is
concerned.
Accordingly, no practices should be adopted to further
this rationale. Mitigating factors that are grounded in the
objective of rehabilitation should be abolished. Rehabilitation
is a worthwhile social objective. The community should
continue to invest in programs that facilitate positive
attitudinal reform in offenders. However, unless there is
evidence of the success of these programs, the objective of
rehabilitation needs to be ignored in developing mitigating
considerations.
One consideration, in particular, which is impacted by
this proposal is remorse. It is widely accepted that remorse
should reduce penalty. However, this should only be the case
if there is evidence to show that remorseful offenders are less
likely to re-offend than those who do not feel contrition. No
such evidence exists. It could be suggested that remorse has
instrumental benefits extending beyond rehabilitative
considerations; however, it is not clear this is the case. People
who commit crime should be contrite: minimum decency
requires such a response.271 People should not get credit for
satisfying an expectation. Rather than being mitigating,
there is an equally strong argument for remorse aggravating
if it is absent—indeed, that is the position in Delaware.272

270. Id. at 57.
271. Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amaraskera, Feeling Sorry? Tell Someone Who
Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOW. L.J. 364, 364 (2001).
272. DELAWARE SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, BENCHBOOK 123, 125
(2013).
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4. Incapacitation—Justified in Relation to Serious Sexual
and Violent Offenders. Incapacitation aims to protect the
community by confining offenders to imprisonment during
which time they can no longer commit offenses. The
effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be judged by the height
of the prison wall. Imprisonment as a means of community
protection is only effective if, but for being imprisoned, the
offender would have committed a further offense.273
There are two forms of incapacitation. The first is
selective incapacitation which focuses on the individual
offender, and its success is contingent upon distinguishing
offenders who will re-offend from those who will not.274 Most
of the research in this area has been directed towards
predicting which serious offenders will re-offend.275 In this
regard, the focus has been on offenders who commit violent
and sexual offenses.
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data
regarding the capacity of any discipline to predict future
criminal behavior noted that predictive techniques “tend to
invite overestimation of the amount of incapacitation to be
expected from marginal increments in imprisonment.”276
More recent actuarial tools have been developed to score
a person’s level of risk by mapping their profile to variables
273. See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 14-15 (May 7, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191128 (noting that some incapacitative models
assume that prison is not part of society); see also Colin Murray, To Punish, Deter
and Incapacitate: Incarceration and Radicalisation in UK Prisons after 9/11, in
PRISONS, TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM 16, 18 (Andrew Silke ed., 2013) (noting that
for incapacitation to work, it is important that inmates do not corrupt other
prisoners).
274. Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST.
359, 381 (2003).
275. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy that is
Incapacitation: An Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent
Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 95, 104-05 (2012) (discussing research
predicting which serious offenders will re-offend) [hereinafter Bagaric &
Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation].
276. FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 86 (1995) [hereinafter ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION].

1210

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

that are known risk factors. Structured professional
judgment and criminogenic needs tools also use a range of
variables277 which are designed to be more nuanced than
actuarial tools because they aim to not only predict the
likelihood of violence, but also the imminence, severity, and
possible targets of the risk.278 These more recent attempts to
accurately predict dangerousness in the context of violent
and sexual offenses have also proven to be deficient.279
While selective incapacitation does not work, general
incapacitation is more effective at reducing crime.280 General
incapacitation involves imprisoning offenders simply because
they have committed a criminal offense on the basis that,
while in prison, they cannot inflict harm in the general
community.281 Little or no effort is normally made to predict
future offending patterns, whether on the basis of previous
criminal history or other considerations. There is no clear
line between selective and general incapacitation and the
difference is often simply one of degree. Once large numbers
277. The LSI-R assessment model, which is used in New South Wales, has fiftyfour variables. See New South Wales Sentencing Council, High-Risk Violent
Offenders: Sentencing and Post-Custody Management Options at 23 (2012),
available at http://www.sentencingcouncil.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/
sentencing/documents/pdf/online%20final%20report%20hrvo.pdf.
278. For a discussion of these tools, see id. at 20-24.
279. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE 107-08 (2009); Jessica
Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J.
APPLIED SEC. RES. 317, 322-23 (2011); see also David J. Cook & Christine Michie,
Violence Risk Assessment: Challenging the Illusion of Certainty, in DANGEROUS
PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick
Keyzer eds., 2011). Most recently, it has been suggested that habitual criminals
and serious offenders have a different brain anatomy compared to other people.
Neuroimaging of the brain showed that such offenders have less activity in
certain areas of the brain, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated with self-awareness, learning
from past experiences and emotions. ADRIAN RAINE, ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 266-70 (2013).
280. For a discussion regarding the distinction between special and collective
incapacitation see generally ZIMRING & HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION, supra note
276, at 60-75 (1997) (discussing the distinction between special and collective
incapacitation).
281. Bagaric & Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation, supra note 275.
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of offenders are imprisoned on the basis of predictive criteria,
which are inaccurate, a process that may have initially had
the appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a
system of general incapacitation. All jurisdictions punish
recidivists more severely than first time offenders.282 Often
the extent of the premium is so significant that it has
effectively evolved into a process of general incapacitation.283
Most of the research into the testing of the general
incapacitation model has been undertaken in the United
States, presumably because of the unprecedented increase in
the prison population over the past thirty years. The weight
of evidence supports the view that general incapacitation
works.
In the United States between 1993 and 2010:
(a) the rate of violent victimization rates decreased by
76%; and
(b) the decline in total household property crime
victimization was 64%.284
During this period, the imprisonment rate rose from
1.365 million to 2.27 million prisoners.285 At face value, these
figures suggest a causal link between imprisoning greater
numbers of offenders and an effective reduction in the crime
rate.
William Spelman has calculated that up to 21% of crime
reduction is attributable to the increased rate of
282. See Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 192, at 345.
283. Id. at 402.
284. JANET L. LAURITSEN AND MARIBETH L. REZEY, NCJ241656, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., MEASURING THE PREVALENCE OF CRIME WITH THE NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
mpcncvs.pdf.
285. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ156241, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
UNITED
STATES,
1993
3
(Oct.
1995),
available
at
http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.paf (stating the 1.365
million figure includes inmates in local jails (456,000) and State and Federal
Prisons (909,000)); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, 3 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (stating the 2.27 million figure
also includes inmates in local jails (749,000) and State and Federal Prisons
(1,518,000)).
THE
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imprisonment.286 Other studies support the success of
incapacitation, but remain equally unclear about its precise
impact. According to literature examined by Roger Warren, a
ten percent increase in imprisonment rates produces a two to
four percent reduction in the crime rate; however, most
relates to non-violent offenses.287
While general incapacitation seems to have some
validity, one constant finding is that it is usually most
effective in relation to minor crime (although some success
can also be achieved in relation to more serious forms of
offending).288 This is because minor offenders re-offend more
frequently than serious offenders. However, while confining
repeat minor criminals clearly disables them from
committing further offenses in the community for a period of
time, it almost certainly does not justify the unrestrained use
of imprisonment to combat non-serious crime.289 The cost of
286. See Spelman, supra note 242, at 484-85.
287. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of
Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43
U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009).
288. See, e.g., BEN VOLLAARD, TILBURG LAW & ECON. CTR., CENTER, PREVENTING
CRIME THROUGH SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 34-35 (TILEC Discussion Paper No.
2011-001, CentER Discussion Paper No. 2010-141, Jan. 2011), available at http://
www.papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738900; Don Weatherburn,
Jiuzhao Hua & Steve Moffatt, How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The
Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary, 93 NSW CRIME & JUST. BULL. 8-9
(Jan. 2006), available at http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/
documents/pdf/cjb93.pdf.
289. It is notoriously difficult to undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis of
imprisonment given the large number of speculative figures involved. See, e.g.,
David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost Benefit Approach to
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 954 (2012). The variables include the efficacy
of imprisonment to achieve the goals of general deterrence, specific deterrence
and incapacitation. Id. at 955-58. The variables associated with the cost of crime
are even cruder and involve numerous methodologies with no agreed variables.
Id. Even Abrams concedes that “[f]urther research will make such cost-benefit
calculations even more useful” and “[m]ore studies that estimate crime costs,
elasticities, prison costs and other parameters for different regions, age groups,
and types of crime are needed.” Id. at 969. Abrams further notes that, “[g]oing
forward, the cost-benefit approach should be expanded to other areas of criminal
justice, including policing, alternate sanctions, and prisoner re-entry programs.”
Id.; see KYM DOSSETOR, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION TO CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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imprisonment probably outweighs the damage non-serious
crimes inflict on the community.290
While the link between re-offending and prior criminality
is strongest in relation to minor offenses, it is not negligible
in relation to serious offenses. The most wide-ranging study
of the trajectory of offenders in Australia was undertaken by
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and released in August,
2010, in a report titled, “An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment
Trends in Australia.”291
The report noted that for prisoners released between
1994 and 1997, about 20% were re-imprisoned within two
years, one-quarter were re-imprisoned within three years,
and 40% by the end of the ten-year survey period.292 Thus,
most of the prison population examined was made up of
people who had been in prison before. Moreover, the data
showed that prisoners with prior imprisonment were twice
as likely as first-timers to return to prison.293
In terms of re-imprisonment trends by offense type, it
was noted that by June 30, 2007, the offenders who were
most commonly re-imprisoned were those sentenced for
burglary (58%), theft (53%), robbery (45%), assault offenses
(44%), and sexual assault (21%).294
Given the limits of predicting serious offending on the
basis of prior convictions, selective incapacitation for serious
offenses seems to be flawed. However, there is stronger
evidence that general incapacitation does work in relation to
such offenses. While most serious offenders do not re-offend,
RESEARCH 7 (2012), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/4/F/
%7bA4FA76DE-535E-48C1-9E60-4CF3F878FD8D%7dtbp042.pdf.
290. See Bagaric & Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation, supra note
275, at 114.
291. See JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, AN ANALYSIS OF REPEAT IMPRISONMENT TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA USING
PRISONER CENSUS DATA FROM 1994 TO 2007, 2 (2010), available at
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A4BE29D48C
A25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031_aug%202010.pdf.
292. Id. at 16.
293. Id. at 19.
294. Id. at 30.
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individuals with previous convictions for serious offenses295
commit crime at a greater frequency than the rest of the
criminal population. Further, offenders with prior
convictions for serious offenses re-offend more frequently
than first-time offenders.
There is insufficient empirical data to enable accurate
and forensic choices to be made about how much extra prison
time should be imposed on recidivists. However, at some
point, there is a diminishing marginal return in terms of
offenses prevented for each year of prison time. In addition,
in any decision-making calculus, certain consequences (in the
form of additional prison time) need to carry more weight
than speculative outcomes (in the form of whether or not a
particular offender would have actually re-offended).
Therefore, while a recidivist loading for serious offenses is
justified, it should be relatively minor, say, twenty to fifty
percent.
Accordingly, the goal of incapacitation can justify a
penalty increase, but only in relation to serious offenses and
where the offender has prior convictions.
The converse also applies in relation to first time
offenders. As noted above, first-time offenders, and those
with a minor criminal record, reoffend at a considerably
lower rate than offenders with a significant criminal
history.296 All offenders with a good criminal record should
receive a sentencing discount. The definition of a good
criminal record is admittedly obscure. For reasons of clarity
a good prior track record should be confined to first offenders.
The reduction to this end, should be in the order of 25%, an
order that is meaningful, but at the same time does not result
in disproportionately low sentences.
In Part II of this Article, I noted that in all sentencing
systems there is a heavy loading that is applicable to
recidivists. I have recently argued that this premium is too
295. For reasons discussed in Part VI of this Article, serious offenses are
confined to sexual and assault offenses.
296. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, First-Time Offender; Productive
Offender; Offender with Dependants: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes)
Matters in Sentencing, 78 ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2014).
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weighty.297 However, victimology studies establish that
sexual and violent offenses (unlike other offenses) often have
a lasting destructive impact on the lives of victims.298
5.
Overview
of
Aggravating
and
Mitigating
Considerations Stemming from Sentencing Objectives. Thus,
from the perspective of the aims of the sentencing system,
very few considerations should increase or decrease penalty.
The objective of absolute deterrence is satisfied merely be
ensuring that the penalty invoked is something that
offenders would seek to avoid, that is, they find it unpleasant.
It does not have to be particularly harsh. It is satisfied by a
prison term—long or short—or, for that matter, probation or
a non-trivial fine.
Incapacitation is a valid sentencing aim. However, it only
serves to justify a prison term for serious sexual and violent
offenders. No other aggravating or mitigating considerations
are justified by reference to the objectives of sentencing. The
obvious caveat here are considerations that relate to
rehabilitation. If rehabilitation is established as an
achievable sentencing aim then considerations such as
remorse, prior good record, and spontaneous offending would
be appropriate mitigating considerations, if it is shown that
these traits are consistent with positive attitudinal reform
and lead to reduced rates of recidivism.
The above analysis supports a very limited number of
aggravating or mitigating factors. Intuitively, this runs
counter to entrenched sentencing methodology where many
variations in the manner in which a crime is committed and
the consequence of a crime can be important aggravating
considerations. One seemingly novel conclusion stemming
from the above analysis is that it runs counter to the view
that premeditated criminal acts and those which cause grave
harm to victims should be treated more harshly than
substantive offenses of the same nature which are committed
297. Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 192.
298. See Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality
of Life, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 191-92 (2010); see also MIKE DIXON ET AL.,
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, CRIMESHARE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACT OF CRIME 25
(2006); Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’ Well-Being
and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141,
155-56 (1998).
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spontaneously and cause little harm to a victim. Moreover,
offenders who are solely responsible for a criminal act or who
have a key role in an offense are currently treated more
severely than those who have a minor role. However, this
discord does not, in fact, follow from my approach. Rather,
these principles are accommodated within a different
sentencing layer, proportionalism, as opposed to the
objectives of sentencing. It is to this doctrine that I now turn.
VI. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING FROM
PROPORTIONALISM
Unlike the objectives of sentencing considered thus far,
proportionalism is concerned with how much to punish as
opposed to the logically prior issue of why we should punish.
The content of the proportionality principle means, logically,
that several mitigating and aggravating considerations are
embedded within its construct.
The principle of proportionality in its most basic, and
persuasive, form requires that the seriousness of the crime is
matched by the harshness of the penalty.299 The
proportionality principle is adopted in all Australian
jurisdictions. A clear statement of the principle of
proportionality is found in the Australian High Court case of
Hoare v The Queen: “[A] basic principle of sentencing law is
that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should
never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or
proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light
of its objective circumstances.”300
In Veen (No 1) v The Queen301 and Veen (No 2) v The
Queen302 the High Court stated that proportionality is the
primary aim of sentencing. It is considered so important that
it cannot be trumped even by the goal of community
protection, which at various times has also been declared as
299. See Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19
MELB. U. L. REV. 489, 492 (1994).
300. [1989] 167 CLR 348, 354.
301. [1979] 143 CLR 458, 467.
302. [1988] 164 CLR 465, 472.
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the most important aim of sentencing.303 Thus, in the case of
dangerous offenders, while community protection remains an
important objective, at common law it cannot override the
principle of proportionality. Proportionality has also been
given statutory recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.304
Proportionality is also a requirement of the sentencing
regimes of ten states in the United States.305 It is also a core
principle that informs the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Guidelines Manual states that one of the three objectives
underpinning the Sentencing Reform Act is “proportionality
in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing
severity.”306
Broken down to its core features, proportionality has two
limbs. The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second
303. See, e.g., Channon v The Queen [1978] 20 ALR 1.
304. The Sentencing Act 1991 provides that one of the purposes of sentencing is
to impose a just punishment, and that in sentencing an offender the court must
have regard to the gravity of the offense and the offender’s culpability and degree
of responsibility. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vict.) SS 5(1)(a), 5(2)(c), 5(2)(d). The
Sentencing Act 1995 states that the sentence must be commensurate with the
seriousness of the offense. Sentencing Act 1995 (W. Austl.) s 6(1). The Crimes
(Sentencing) Act 2005 provides that the sentence must be just and appropriate.
Crimes (sentencing) Act 2005 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) s 7(1)(a). In the Northern
Territory and Queensland, the relevant sentencing statute provides that the
punishment imposed on the offender must be just in all the circumstances.
Sentencing Act 1995 (N. Terr.) s 5(1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld.)
s 9(1)(a). In South Australia, the emphasis is upon ensuring that the defendant
is adequately punished for the offense. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (S.
Austl.) s 10(1)(k). The need for a sentencing court to adequately punish the
offender is also fundamental to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth
matters. See Crimes Act 1914 (commonwealth) s 16A(2)(k). The same phrase is
used in the New South Wales. See Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999 (N.S.W.)
pt 1 s 3A(a).
305. See Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIZ.
L. REV. 241, 250-58 (2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois,
Oregon, Washington and West Virginia).
306. The most basic objective is to “combat crime through an effective, fair
sentencing system” through (i) “honesty in sentencing” (i.e., removing the power
of the parole commission to reduce the term to be served); (ii) “reasonable
uniformity in sentencing—by reducing the wide disparity of sentences for similar
offenses”; and (iii) “proportionate sentences.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra
note 40, § 1.3.
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is the harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a
quantitative component—the two limbs must be matched. In
order for the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the
crime must be equal to the harshness of the penalty.
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is
so vague as to be meaningless in light of the fact that there
is no stable and clear manner in which the punishment can
be matched to the crime. Jesper Ryberg notes that one of the
key and damaging criticisms of proportionality is that it
“presupposes something which is not there, namely, some
objective measure of appropriateness between crime and
punishment.”307 The most obscure aspect of proportionality is
that there is no established and clear manner in which the
punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper Ryberg
further notes that to give content to the theory it is necessary
to rank crimes, rank punishments, and anchor the scales.308
There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. And, as noted
by Ian Leader-Elliott and George Fletcher, the application of
the proportionality principle is especially difficult in the case
of offenses such as drug offenses, where there is no direct,
clear and observable harm caused by the crime.309 The
principle of proportionality applies to offenders who traffic in
drugs no less than it does to offenders who inflict injury or
death. In the trafficking offenses, however, there is not the
same intuitive, retributive ground for determining a
punishment to fit the offense. There is no natural measure of
proportionality in offenses that are supposed to secure the
common good. The American theorist, George Fletcher,
makes the point in his discussion of crimes of lese majeste:
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in turn
requires sensitivity to the injury inflicted. . . . The more the victim
suffers, the more pain should be inflicted on the criminal. In the
context of betrayal, the gears of this basic principle of justice, the
307. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 184 (2004).
308. See id. at 185. Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the
proportionality principle in a manner which provides firm guidance regarding
appropriate sentencing ranges. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 122 (2005).
309. Ian Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by Weight: Proposed Changes to the
Commonwealth Code Serious Drug Offenses, 36 CRIM. L.J. 265, 278 (2012).
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lex talionis, fail to engage the problem. The theory of punishment
does not mesh with the crime when there is no tangible harm, no
friction against the physical welfare of the victim.310

While, doctrinally, it has been argued that there is a
manner in which firmer content could be accorded to the
proportionality doctrine,311 an exact matching of offense
severity and penalty harshness is not feasible in light of the
current understanding of proportionalism.
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and
resolved for current purposes. Irrespective of the precise
manner in which harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a
cardinal criterion is the extent to which it sets back the
interests and flourishing of victims. Accordingly, homicide
offenses are the most serious. Offenses causing considerable
degrees of permanent impairment—whether physical or
mental—also rate highly, as do sexual offenses.312 Culpability
is also an entrenched aspect of this limb of the proportionality
thesis.313 Andrew Von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg contend that
the “seriousness of a crime has two dimensions: harm and
culpability. Harm refers to the injury done or risked by the
act; culpability, to the factors of intent, motive and
circumstance that determine the extent to which the offender
should be held accountable for the act.”314
Thus, it follows that considerations that relate to
culpability are capable of aggravating or mitigating penalty.
For this reason, planned offenses are more serious than those
committed spontaneously, and offenders who have a central
role in a crime are more blameworthy than peripheral
players.
Further, the impact of the crime on victims and the effect
of the sanction on offenders should also impact the penalty.
Acts by offenders which reduce the level of the harm
stemming from the offense should be mitigatory. This
310. Id. (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993)).
311. See Bagaric, Injecting Content, supra note 221, at 412.
312. See id. at 433.
313. Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A LivingStandard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1991).
314. Id.
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consideration applies most acutely in relation to property
offenses because the value of the loss can be measured
precisely (apart from where the property has sentimental
value). It is manifest that a victim who has $10,000 stolen
from him or her which is returned by the offender suffers far
less than a victim of a $10,000 theft who receives no
restitution.
On the other side of the proportionality equation, the
same reasoning applies. The main criterion regarding
penalty severity is the extent to which the penalty sets back
the interests and flourishing of offenders. Prison is damaging
because human beings have an innate desire for freedom and
the capacity to shape their activities and lives according to
their preferences. Moreover, certain prison conditions are
considerably harsher than those typically designated by this
type of sanction. The harshest prison conditions are those
found in super-maximum prisons.315 These prisons normally
consist of “jails within prisons.”316 There is no uniformity to
such conditions but, in general, they involve “incarcerating
inmates under highly isolated conditions with severely
limited access to programs, exercise, staff, or other
inmates.”317
It is generally accepted that the first super-maximum
prison was the rock fortress Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay,
which was operated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons
from 1934 until its closure in 1963.318 However, this prison
bears little semblance to modern super-maximum prisons.
The conditions which typically manifest in current super315. See RUTGERS UNIV. PRESS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 9
(Jeffrey Ian Ross ed., 2013) (discussing operations of supermax prisons in each of
nine countries).
316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L INST. OF CORR. SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 (1999).

317. Id. They have also been defined as “. . . a free-standing facility, or a distinct
unit within a facility, that provides for the management and secure control of
inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or seriously
disruptive behavior while incarcerated. . . . [T]heir behavior can be controlled only
by separation, restricted movement, and limited direct access to staff and other
inmates.” Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in
Search of a Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 170 (1999).
318. King, supra note 317, at 165-66.
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maximum conditions can be traced back over forty years to
the lockdown which occurred in the U.S. Prison at Marion,
Illinois, following increasing prisoner misbehavior, including
the killing of two prison officers.319 More than thirty U.S.
states now have super-maximum prisons.320
Super-maximum prisons are now part of the landscape
in a large number of countries, including Great Britain,
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil and the
Netherlands.321 There is no consistency regarding the exact
daily regimes of prisoners, but it can include being locked in
their cells for up to twenty-three hours per day.322 Inmates
often do not have access to fresh air, direct sunlight, or
educational facilities, and have limited visiting rights and
access to communications facilities.323 In some circumstances,
the regime is less restrictive, but it always involves being
warehoused in a concrete room and the time spent out of a
cell is, in effect, spent in a slightly larger concrete cell.
This type of incarceration is far harsher than
mainstream prison conditions. It should be reflected in the
sanction limb of the proportionality thesis and, hence, result
in a reduction of penalty in the order of fifty percent.324
319. Id. at 165.
320. Id. at 163.
321. See generally RUTGERS UNIV. PRESS, supra note 315 (discussing the
operations in each of these countries).
322. See R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No. 20) [2008] VSC 80 [30] (Austl.).
323. NSW COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, Inquiry into Issues Relating to the
Operations and Management of the Department of Corrective Services 2 (Jan. 30,
2006), available at http://parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/
6F44CC02AA91917CCA25711700015742 (Austl.); see also DAVID BROWN, The
Effect of Terrorism and Terrorist Trails on Australian Prison Regimes, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY
CONFERENCE 64-65 (Chris Cuneen & Michael Salter eds., 2008).
324. This limb of the proportionality principle is also reflected in the view that
sanctions should be structured so that they have the same impact on offenders
who are deserving of the same punishment. As noted by Andrew Ashworth, the
need for equal impact of sanctions minimally entails that, “the system should
strive to avoid grossly unequal impacts on offenders. . . . ” ANDREW ASHWORTH,
SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 80 (2d ed., 1995). A 50% reduction is the
amount that previously has been accorded by Australian courts for harsh prison
conditions. See Mirko Bagaric et al., (Particularly) Burdensome Prison Time
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The impact on the offender is not always confined to the
immediate deprivation stemming from the crime. Offending
can have collateral but real deprivations in the form of public
opprobrium, reduction of opportunities, and injury by the
offender during the commission of the offense. In Australia,
the balance of authority indicates that shame can be a
mitigating factor but that it generally carries little weight. In
Kenny v The Queen the court stated that public shame could
be given some weight if it was so significant as to damage the
person physically or psychologically.325 In R v Nuttall; Ex
parte Attorney-General (Qld) the view was taken that “the
respondent’s loss of employment and lack of job prospects on
his release are relevant considerations” in sentencing.326
Further, where an offender is harmed in the course of
committing an offense, it can reduce the penalty. In R v
Hannigan, Justice Chesterman stated:
[T]he theory which underlies the relevance of extra-curial
punishment to sentence is that it deters an offender from reoffending by providing a reminder of the unhappy consequence of
criminal misconduct, or it leaves the offender with a disability,
some affliction, which is a consequence of criminal activity. In such
cases one can see that a purpose of sentencing by the court,
deterrence or retribution, has been partly achieved.327

All of these deprivations are directly related to the crime.
They are not imposed by the sentencing judge; however, the
pain is just as real and hence they should be capable of
reducing the sentence. Further, unintended harm caused to
victims by offenders—such as emotional distress—is capable
of aggravating penalty, and, to enable unintended harm—so
far as the sentencing court is concerned—caused to offenders
as a result of the offense to reduce penalty, injects a degree
of coherency into this area of sentencing law.

Should Reduce Imprisonment Length—and Not Merely in Theory, 38 MELB. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6).
325. [2010] NSWCCA 6 [49] (Austl.); see also Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR
267 (Austl.).
326. [2011] QCA 120 [59] (Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreeing) (Austl.).
327. [2009] 193 A Crim R 399 [25].
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VII. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING
FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Having ascertained the mitigating and aggravating
factors that stem from the objectives of sentencing and
proportionalism, it is necessary to widen the examination to
determine whether the substantive criminal law underpins
any such considerations. Ostensibly, the answer is no. The
substantive criminal law demarcates the distinction between
behavior that is a crime and that which attracts no criminal
liability. This distinction is done by setting out the nature of
criminal acts, each of which is separated into distinct
elements, and defining defenses to those acts. Each criminal
act has a maximum penalty, and, as we saw in Part III of this
Article in the case of offenses committed in the United States,
often a presumptive penalty.
The objectives of the substantive criminal law are
reflected in the designation of the type of behavior which is
categorized as a crime and the parameters as defined by the
elements of the offense. Complex policy decisions inform the
decisions regarding which type of behavior to criminalize. All
western nations, with varying degrees of specificity,
proscribe conduct that involves deliberate infringements on
the right to life, bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, liberty
and property. Criminalization often extends well beyond
these parameters to include behavior such as drug use and
road traffic compliance.328 Once these decisions have been
made, there seems to be no further scope for the elements of
the crime to influence sentence, beyond the sentence that has
already been designated for the offense.
Thus, it might appear that a premeditated murder is
more serious than a spur-of-the-moment killing, and a
$100,000 theft is worse than a theft of $10; however, if these
differences are meaningful, they should presumably be
reflected either in the different substantive classification of
the offenses or maximum or presumptive penalties. In fact,
this often is the case. Thus, for example, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines create a higher penalty for thefts in
328. Mirko Bagaric, The “Civil-isation” of the Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. L.J. 184,
188 (2005).
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excess of $10,000.329 Once these parameters are set and
accommodated, the impact of the substantive criminal law on
sentencing is arguably exhausted.
However, on closer reflection, an area of substantive
criminal law that can influence mitigating and aggravating
considerations is criminal defenses. In general, the
substantive criminal law draws strict lines relating to the
applicability of defenses. All criminal law systems have
narrow and often technical defenses to crime. They are often
based on general over-arching excuses and justifications330
which are recognized in some form by most western criminal
justice systems. The key excuses which can exculpate
otherwise criminal conduct are self-defense, duress or
coercion, necessity and insanity.331 The criteria for legal
excuses are necessarily narrow due to the binary nature of
criminal law, that is, offenders are either guilty or innocent
and, if the latter, they are beyond the bounds of legal censure
or punishment. Sentencing, on the other hand, is not so clearcut and there is potential scope for degrees of blame and
wrongdoing that can be accommodated by adjusting the level
of punishment.
Thus, circumstances that are similar to those that could
attract a legal defense, but fall short of constituting a
criminal defense should potentially, at least, constitute
mitigating considerations. This approach has the additional
advantage of injecting a degree of coherency and consistency
throughout the criminal law system. All of the defenses have
discrete elements that need to be satisfied in order to excuse
what is otherwise criminal behavior.332 The exact content of
329. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 2B1.1(b)(1).
330. The difference between excuse and justification is not relevant for the
purposes of broader observations regarding the distinction, see Mirko Bagaric,
Australia, in ALAN REED & MICHAEL BOHLANDER, GENERAL DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL
LAW—DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric,
Australia].
331. See TEN, supra note 1, ch. 5 (discussing the justification of criminal
excuses).
332. See Stephen S. Schwartz, Is there a Common Law Necessity Defense in
Federal Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259 (2008) (discussing the elements
of necessity and its divergence in some United States jurisdictions). For a
discussion of the elements of duress, see Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior:
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these defenses varies slightly across jurisdictions.333
However, the justification and rationale for the defenses are
universal.334
Failed criminal defenses have a link to exculpatory
criminal behavior, and, hence, should logically attract
mitigation. However, if they are to operate in this way, their
impact should be minor given that the substantive law has
determined that they fall short of meeting the elements of the
defense. In mathematical terms, such considerations
warrant no more than, say, a ten percent discount.
Intoxication is also a defense to crime in limited
situations335 and, hence, can potentially operate as a
mitigating factor when the extent of intoxication is not
sufficient to constitute a defense. However, on balance, it
should not operate in this manner. The conceptual basis for
intoxication operating as a defense is disputable and there is
a clear link between intoxication and crime. In particular, a
large amount of violence is alcohol-fueled.336 The link between
alcohol and crime is well-known and it is foreseeable to most
people that consumption of alcohol may increase the
likelihood of engaging in crime. There is in fact a powerful
argument for making intoxication an aggravating factor—as
is generally the case in Australia.337 Thus, it follows that
alcohol consumption should not reduce penalties.

Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying
on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575 (2011).
333. See Schwartz, supra note 332, at 1260; see also Bedi, supra note 332, at
579, 591-92. The differences are irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion,
given that any argument for extending a legal excuse to a mitigating sentencing
consideration is necessarily based on the fact that elements of the defense have
not been fully satisfied.
334. The justifications are discussed in Bagaric, Australia, supra note 330.
335. Id.
336. Anthony Morgan & Amanda McAtamney, Key Issues in Alcohol-Related
Violence,
AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.aic.gov.au/
publications/current%20series/rip/1-10/04.html (Dec. 2009).
337. See R v Currie [1988] 33 A Crim R 7 (Austl.); see also Baumer v The Queen
[1987] 27 A Crim R 143 (Austl.); R v Laffey [1998] 1 VR 155, 160-62 (Austl.);
Director of Public Prosecutions v Martin [2009] VSCA 316 [6] (Austl.); R v Henry
[1999] 106 A Crim R 149 [192] (Austl.).
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Similar considerations apply in relation to provocation
which is a defense in some jurisdictions. Once again, the
doctrinal underpinnings of the defense are dubious. The
main flaw in provocation as a defense is that it assumes that
people who lash out because of a loss of self-control are
assumed to be less blameworthy than those who harm others
for other reasons. This presumption assumes that anger is an
emotion that should be accommodated by the law. This
rationale is flawed for two key reasons. First, anger should
be not rewarded more than other demonstrably less
objectionable emotions. As noted by Arenson et al.:
[T]here is no reason in logic or principal for allowing anger alone to
serve as an excuse. As noted by J. Horder,
why do we regard anger as an excusing condition but not
killings motivated by spite, greed, and lust? Or for that
matter, if the current defense of provocation is used as a
benchmark for the development of legal principle, why do we
not allow emotions that are palpably desirable to be similarly
excusatory when they manifest an intention to kill? Is it
justifiable that a person who kills another out of love and
kindness in a euthanasia scenario should be guilty of murder,
yet an accused who kills in anger should be convicted of the
lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter?338

The other flaw with the provocation defense is that it
relies on the assumption that anger should exculpate crime
because it is unavoidable. Thus, provocation is viewed as a
concession to the frailty of human nature.339 The view that
anger is a natural human feeling that reduces self-control,
making law-abiding behavior more difficult,340 is flawed. It
has been noted that humans have a far greater capacity to

338. KEN ARENSON ET. AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE COMMON LAW
JURISDICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 4 (2011) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 194, 197 (Clarendon
Press 1992)).
339. See Stanley Yeo, Peisley: Case and Comment, 16 CRIM. L.J. 197, 198-99
(1992).
340. Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on
a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 1001 (2002).
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control emotions than is suggested by the provocation
defense.341
Anger is an undesirable and damaging emotion. It is not
a mindset that should be accommodated by the law.
Individuals need to take responsibility for their conduct. Any
legal principle that departs from this premise on the basis of
speculation (i.e., people cannot control their emotions) is
flawed and should be abolished and, hence, provocation
should not be a mitigating factor in sentencing.
While intoxication—and, in some cases, provocation—is
a recognized defense that should not be a mitigating
consideration, there is one consideration in which the reverse
applies, in that it cannot provide a defense to a criminal act
but should be a mitigating factor. Several theorists have
argued that poverty should exculpate crime in some
circumstances.342 While this idea has not influenced the
operation of the substantive criminal law, it is clear that
wealth confers choice and opportunity, while poverty is
restrictive and often leads to frustration and resentment.
Rich people who commit crime are, arguably, more
blameworthy than the poor who engage in the same conduct
because the capacity of the rich to do otherwise is greater.
Yet, it has been argued that we cannot allow poverty to
mitigate criminal punishment.343 Otherwise, we potentially
license or encourage people to commit crime. There is
considerable force in this latter perspective. There is a nonreducible baseline standard of conduct that is expected of all
individuals, no matter how poor. It is never tolerable to inflict
serious bodily or sexual injury on another person. Deprived
background should not mitigate such crimes. However, a
stronger argument can be made in favor of economic
deprivation mitigating other forms of offenses, such as drug
341. Luke Neal & Mirko Bagaric, Provocation: The Ongoing Subservience of
Principle to Tradition, 67 J. CRIM. L. 237, 246-47 (2003).
342. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51 (3d prtg. 1973); see also Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social
Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 85-90 (1985).
343. See generally Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender: Why it
(sometimes) Matters in Sentencing, LAW & INEQ. (forthcoming 2015).
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and property crimes. In relation to these offenses, the impact
on victims is generally less severe, and hence, the burden of
poverty is the more compelling consideration. It should be
reflected in a discount for impoverished non-violent and nonsexual offenses.344
VIII. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING
FROM THE GENERAL LEGAL SYSTEM
The third point of reference that affects the choice of
aggravating and mitigating considerations is the legal
system as a whole. Most of the objectives of the legal system
in general are too broad to drive any particular sentencing
considerations. At the broadest level, the objectives of the
legal system involve the need to co-ordinate, control and
regulate human behavior by establishing binding norms that
comply with the cardinal rule of law virtues in the form of
clarity, certainty and fairness.345
However, there are some particular pragmatic and
doctrinal aspects of the legal system that are capable of
directing sentencing law and practice. The main
consideration of this nature is the need for efficiency in the
disposition of criminal matters. Justice should be swift.346
Accordingly, the state has an interest in reducing the delay
between the time of charge, verdict and sentence. There is
also a preference to minimize the cost of the legal system.
Hence, measures should be put in place to reduce the number
of criminal trials. Offenders who plead guilty are less of a
financial burden on the community than those who contest
matters, and a guilty plea generally finalizes such matters
faster.
Thus, a strong argument can be mounted for according a
discount to offenders who plead guilty. As noted earlier, the
guilty plea discount is one of the two most important
mitigating considerations in Australia. The rationale for the
discount is summarized by Justices Gaudron, Gummow and
344. See id. at 19-26.
345. See RAZ, supra note 206, at 214-17; FINNIS, supra note 206, at 270-71.
346. See Speedy Trial Act 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3171; Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Jago v
District Court [NSW] [1989] 168 CLR 23 [32] (Austl.).
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Callinan in a decision by the High Court of Australia in
Cameron v The Queen:
Australian courts have enthusiastically embraced the proposition
that a person who pleads guilty should receive a lesser sentence
than one who pleads not guilty and is convicted. In so far as a plea
of guilty indicates remorse and contrition on the part of the
defendant, the courts have long recognised it as a mitigating factor
of importance. But in recent years, under the pressure of delayed
hearings and ever increasing court lists, Australian courts have
indicated that they will regard a plea of guilty as a mitigating factor
even when no remorse or contrition is present. They have taken the
pragmatic view that giving sentence “discounts” to those who plead
guilty at the earliest available opportunity encourages pleas of
guilty, reduces the expense of the criminal justice system, reduces
court delays, avoids inconvenience to witnesses and prevents the
misuse of legal aid funds by the guilty.347

The time and cost-savings stemming from guilty pleas
provide powerful arguments in favor of maintaining the
discount. Absent the guilty plea discount, there is no
incentive for accused persons to plead guilty, no matter how
compelling the case against them. It would, in fact, be
contrary to the best interests of the accused to plead guilty.
This was a point noted in R v Shannon:
If a plea of guilty . . . cannot be regarded as a factor in mitigation of
penalty, there is no incentive . . . for an offender to
admit . . . guilt . . . if the offender has nothing to gain by admitting
guilt, he will see no reason for doing so.348

Apart
from
time
and
cost-savings—and
the
consequential reduction in court delays—it has also been
suggested that another reason in support of the guilty plea
discount is that it avoids inconvenience to witnesses. In R v
Thomson the court noted:
A plea permits the healing process to commence. A victim does not
have to endure the uncertainty of not knowing whether he or she
will be believed, nor the skepticism sometimes displayed by friends

347. Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6 [39] (Austl.) (emphasis added).
348. R v Shannon [1979] 21 SASR 442, 451 (Austl.).
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and even family prior to a conviction. A victim will also be spared
the personal rumination of the events . . . .349

The persuasiveness of this justification involves a degree
of speculation. The court in R v Thomson recognized that this
“is a consideration which varies to a significant degree with
the nature of, and circumstances of, an offence.”350
Nevertheless, at least in some circumstances, the avoidance
of inconvenience and distress to witnesses may have a value
worth rewarding through a guilty plea discount.
The legal system also has a preference for substantive
accuracy over pragmatic expedience, and hence, the discount
should not be so large as to entice the innocent to plead
guilty.351 In Australia, the normal range of the discount is
between ten percent and about thirty percent, depending on
the circumstances of the case. In several jurisdictions it is
either conventional or a statutory requirement to indicate the
size of the discount.352 The discount range seems to have
349. [2000] 49 NSWCCA 309, 386 (Austl.).
350. Id.
351. See Mirko Bagaric & Julie Brebner, The Solution to the Dilemma Presented
by the Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea—I’m Pleading Guilty Only
Because of the Discount, 30 INT’L J. SOC. LAW 51, 51 (2002).
352. In New South Wales and Queensland, the Court must indicate if it does not
award a sentencing discount in recognition of a guilty plea. Crimes (Sentencing
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 22(2); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(3).
In South Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales, the courts often
specify the size of the discount given. In Victoria, section 6AAA of the Sentencing
Act 1991 (Vic) states that when courts provide a discount for a plea of guilty, they
must specify the sentence that would have been given in the absence of that
discount. Sentencing Act 1991 (VIC) s 6AAA. The rationale and size of the typical
discount in Victoria is discussed in Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 [2631]. There has been some judicial comment as to the artificiality of section 6AAA
given the instinctive synthesis that produces the actual sentence. See Scerri v The
Queen [2010] VSCA 287 [23]–[25]; R v Flaherty (No 2) [2008] 19 VR 305; see also
RICHARD FOX & ARIE FREIBERG, SENTENCING: STATE AND FEDERAL OFFENDERS 32627 (2d ed., 1999); GERALDINE MACKENZIE & NIGEL STOBBS, PRINCIPLES OF
SENTENCING 90-91 (2010). In Western Australia, section 9AA of the Sentencing
Act 1995 (WA) permits a court to reduce a sentence by up to 25% for a plea entered
into at the first reasonable opportunity. In South Australia, recent legislative
changes allow for a guilty plea reduction of up to 40% for an early guilty plea. See
Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA) (introducing
sections 10B and 10C into the section Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA)).
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struck an effective balance between all of the respective
considerations.
Another aim of the law is to encourage legal observance
and achieve effective enforcement when the law is violated.
Thus, a key aim of the legal system is to reduce crime and
make offenders accountable for their crimes. This broad aim
is also, arguably, an aim of the sentencing system. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that “the [Sentencing
Reform] Act’s basic objective was to enhance the ability of the
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective,
fair sentencing system.”353 The Guidelines add that “most
observers of the criminal law argue that the ultimate aim of
the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is the control
of crime.”354
Thus, as a matter of public policy, the law should
encourage those involved in criminal behavior to betray the
confidence reposed in each other by providing a significant
discount at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice
system.355 This is especially apposite given that it often places
the offender in personal danger.356
The discount for co-operating with authorities should be
considerable given its importance to the legal system as a
whole. Indeed, in Australia, it is already one of the most
compelling mitigating factors.357 In terms of the size of the
discount that is available, it has been held that the discount
for a plea of guilty and assistance to authorities should be up
to fifty percent.358 As with the guilty plea discount, this
353. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2.
354. Id. at 4.
355. Malvaso v The Queen [1989] 168 CLR 227, 239 (Deane and McHugh, JJ).
356. R v Barber [1976] 14 SASR 388, 390 (Bray CJ); see also Director of Public
Prosecutions (Cth) v AB [2006] 94 SASR 316.
357. See Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(h); Crimes (Sentencing)
Procedure Act 1999 (NSW) s 23; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s
10(1)(h), 10A; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 8(5); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005
(ACT) s 36. There are also similar provisions at the Commonwealth level. See
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16(2)(h) (Austl.).
358. For an example of where a fifty percent discount was allowed, see R v
Johnston [2008] 186 A Crim R 345 [15]-[21] (Nettle JA). For an application of
these principles, see Dan Ning Wang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 319 [31]-[32];
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benefit is given independent of any reasons or remorse that
might be demonstrated by assisting the authorities.
An even more wide-ranging objective of criminal justice
is that the innocent should not be punished.359 Accordingly,
the impact of the penalty visited on others is a relevant
consideration. The impact of a sentence on individuals other
than the offender comes in degrees. Nearly every individual
is socially connected. However, some people are cardinal to
the flourishing of others. Offenders are sometimes the
financial, social, and emotional cornerstones to the lives of
other individuals. Their confinement could have a
devastating impact on those closely associated to them;
typically, their children or spouse. It is accepted in Australia
that hardship to others can constitute a mitigating factor.
However, the hardship on others must reach a level that is
exceptional in order to be relevant to sentence.360 In R v
Berlinsky361 Justice Doyle stated: “The effect of an order of
imprisonment on the dependents and immediate family of
the imprisoned person is often a sad feature of the sentencing
process. A court can make some allowance for it, but usually
only in exceptional cases.”
It could be countered that the consequence of a sanction
reduction on the basis of the impact on the relatives of the
offender provides a license for the well-connected to commit
crime. The reality is that the utility of this supposed license
is greatly reduced by capping the weight for this
consideration to, say, a maximum of ten percent.
Thus, mitigating factors stemming from this wider
context are:

Yue Ma v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 320. This contrasts with the decision in R
v Sahari [2007] VSCA 235 [16]-[17], where it was held undesirable to specify a
discount for co-operating with authorities.
359. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 216, at 180.
360. The basis for the test of exceptional hardship to translate into a mitigating
factor that may lead to the offender avoiding an immediate term of imprisonment
was established in the seminal case of R v Wirth [1976] 14 SASR 291, 295.
361. [2005] SASC 316 [28]; see also R v Day [1998] 100 A Crim R 275 at 277-78
per Wood J.
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pleading guilty;
providing assistance to authorities; and
considerable hardship to dependents.

IX. SUMMARY OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
CONSIDERATIONS
Overall, there should only be seventeen considerations
that aggravate or mitigate penalty. The relevant aggravating
factors are:
 prior criminal record;
 high degree of involvement in crime;
 high degree of planning; and
 high level of harm.
The relevant mitigating considerations are:
 spontaneous offense;
 severe impact from punishment;
 incidental punishment;
 restitution of property;
 self-defense;
 necessity;
 duress or coercion;
 mental illness (falling short of insanity);
 plea of guilty;
 assistance to authorities;
 harm to dependents;
 deprived socio-economic background (in relation to
non-violent and non-sexual offenses only); and
 clean criminal record.
In order to ensure consistency and transparency, it is
important to attribute weight to each of the considerations.
There is no accepted theory regarding the respective weight
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of aggravating or mitigating factors362 and, obviously, the
exact weight accorded to the considerations involves a degree
of approximation. However, this is less desirable than
leaving the matters to the discretion of individual sentencing
judges363 and allows for informed revision of any weightings
if practice uncovers any errors or unintended consequences
stemming from the stated position.
The weightings that should be attributed to some of the
considerations have been disclosed above; however, for the
sake of comprehensiveness, a maximum weighting should be
attached to all considerations. To this end, all of the
mitigating factors which are, in effect, failed criminal
defenses should attract a minor departure from penalty of,
say, more than 10%. In a similar vein, the harm caused by
the offense and the level of involvement in a crime are often
reflected in the substantive nature of the crime, hence, these
too should only attract a 10% variation. The degrees of
planning, or lack of it, associated with the commission of a
crime are two sides of the same coin and do not reflect
strongly on the outcome of the crime, hence, they should also
carry no more than a 10% loading.
For reasons set out above, a criminal record should
attract a loading of up to 50%. The current loading given to a
plea of guilty in Australia seems to strike the balance
between encouraging offenders not to take matters to trial,
while not being significant enough to coerce them into
pleading guilty even if they have a tenable defense. Thus, a
25% reduction for pleading guilty is suitable. A similar
discount should be granted for assisting the authorities.
The difference in the level of hardship between normal
and super maximum prison conditions is profound, and
hence, attracts up to a 50% loading. The incidental
362. Jessica Jacobson & Mike Hough, Personal Mitigation in England and
Wales, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 146, 154 (Julian V.
Roberts ed., 2011). In an empirical study of mitigating factors based on interviews
with sentencers, it was noted that the factors accorded most weight were clinical
depression, support from victim’s family, drug treatment, remorse, regret, and
moment of madness; and those with lesser weight were partner and children,
illiterate, and abused as a child.
363. See Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness – The
Need to Abolish the Stain that is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38(1) U.N.S.W. L.J.
(forthcoming 2015).
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punishment experienced by an offender in terms of loss of
employment and profession can be considerable in terms of
its impact on life flourishing, as it can be in terms of the
impact on the flourishing of dependents. These two
considerations should be capable of attracting a loading in
the order of 20%.
These factors do not operate in a simple cumulative
manner; otherwise, a combination of mitigating factors could
potentially amount to a discount of 100% or more. Instead,
the discounts or additions are to be applied individually to
the contracted sentence following application of the previous
consideration. Thus, pleading guilty and assisting
authorities does not lead to a 50% discount of the entire
sentence. Rather, the discount is 43% (i.e., 25% plus the
remaining part of the sentence [75%] multiplied by 25%).
CONCLUSION
Aggravating and mitigating considerations can have a
profound effect on the sentence imposed on an offender. Yet,
there is no accepted doctrinal theory which underpins and
justifies those factors. The law is a complex inquiry, and it is
not unusual for there to be an absence of consensus regarding
the theoretical underpinning and practical application of a
body of law. However, it is rare for the law to be in a state of
confusion such as is the case relating to aggravating and
mitigating considerations. There has not even been a
considered attempt to cohere and justify this area of law,
resulting in a jurisprudential wasteland. This Article
attempts to provide a unifying theory.
I conclude that considerations should only aggravate or
mitigate sentences if they are justified by reference to one of
four broader objectives, namely: (i) the sentencing system; (ii)
the proportionality principle; (iii) the criminal justice system;
or (iv) the wider well-established principles of justice.
In summary, there should only be seventeen
considerations that aggravate or mitigate penalty. They are
now summarized.
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Consideration
Prior criminal record
for serious sexual and
violent offenses
High degree of
involvement in crime
High degree of
planning
High level of harm

[Vol. 62

Maximum
weight

Rationale

50%

Incapacitation

10%

Proportionality (culpability)

10%

Proportionality (culpability)

10%

Proportionality
(harm to victim)

Table 1: Aggravating Factors

Consideration
Severe impact from
punishment (e.g., harsh
prison conditions)

Maximum
weight
50%

Rationale
Proportionality
(harm to offender)

Plea of guilty

25%

Assisting authorities
Socio-economic
deprivation—only for
non-sexual and nonviolent offenses

25%

Reduce delay and cost of
criminal justice system
Reduce crime

25%

Proportionality (culpability)

Restitution of property

25%

Proportionality
(harm to victim)

Harm to dependents of
the offender

20%

Incidental punishment

20%

Spontaneous offending

10%

Self-defense

10%

Necessity

10%

Duress or coercion

Mental illness

10%
10%

Proportionality
(harm to offender)
Proportionality (culpability)
Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal
law)
Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal
law)
Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal
law)
Failed criminal defense
(coherency of the criminal
law)

Table 2: Mitigating Considerations
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A limitation of the analysis in this Article is the
uncertain nature regarding the efficacy of criminal
punishment to achieve popular sentencing objectives. If the
empirical data concerning the efficacy of the sentencing
system to achieve key sentencing goals changes, it will affect
the choice and development of aggravating and mitigating
considerations. This is especially the case in relation to
rehabilitation. The current empirical evidence is inconclusive
regarding the capacity of criminal sanctions to reform
offenders. Accordingly, mitigating factors, which are sought
to be justified by reference to the rehabilitative ideal, should
not be pursued. If it is established that rehabilitation is
effective, the considerations that have an impact on the rate
of re-offending should appear on the mitigating side of the
ledger. Moreover, irrespective of the success of rehabilitation,
if other considerations are established as being consistent
with lower rates of recidivism, such as remorse, youth, and
good character, they should also reduce penalty.
Thus, the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in
this Article are not necessarily determinative or fixed.
However, this Article has sought to enshrine the
methodology for ascertaining the validity of aggravating and
mitigating considerations, and to clearly articulate
considerations which, on the basis of current knowledge, are
justifiable. The Article also sets out the relative importance
of these mitigating factors. In this way, the contours and
structure of sentencing law and procedure are manifestly
clearer.

